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Abstract 
The predominant game-theoretic solutions for distributed rate-maxImization 
algorithms in Gaussian interference channels through optimal power control 
reqUIre perfect channel knowledge, whIch is not possIble in practIce due to 
varIOUS reasons, such as estimation errors, feedback quantization and latency 
between channel estimation and sigual transmission. ThIS thesis therefore 
aims at addressing this Issue through the deslgu and analysIS of robust game-
theoretic algorithms for rate-maximization In Gaussian interference channels 
in the presence of bounded channel uncertainty. 
A robust rate-maximization game is formulated for the slllgle-antenna 
frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel 
uncertainty. The robust-optinuzation equilIbrIum solution for this game is 
independent of the probabilIty distrIbutIOn of the channel uncertamty. The 
eXIstence and uniqueness of the eqUIlIbrium are studIed and sufficient condi-
tions for the uniqueness of the equilIbrIum are provided DistrIbuted algo-
rithms to compute the equilIbrIum solutIOn are presented and shown to have 
guaranteed asymptotic convergence when the game has a unique eqUIlIbrium 
The sum-rate and the price of anarchy at the eqUIlIbrIUm of this game 
are analyzed for the two-user scenario and shown to Improve WIth increase In 
channel uncertainty under cert81n condItions. These results indIcate that the 
robust solution moves closer to a frequency dIVISIon multIple access (FDMA) 
solution when uncertainty increases. ThIS leads to a higher sum-rate and a 
lower price of anarchy for systems where FDMA IS globally optImal 
A robust rate-maximization game for multi-antenna Gaussian lllterfer-
ence channels in the presence of channel uncert81nty IS also developed along 
sinular prinCIples. It is shown that thIS robust game is equivalent to the 
nomlllal game with modIfied channel matrices The robust-optimizatIOn 
eqUIlIbrIum for thIS game and a distrIbuted algorithm for its computation 
are presented and characterIzed Sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of 
the eqUIlIbrium and asymptotic convergence of the algOrIthm are presented. 
Numerical simulations are used to confirm the behaviour of these algo-
rithms. The analytical and numerIcal results of this thesis mdicate that 
channel uncertamty is not necessarIly detrImental, but can indeed result in 
Improvement of performance of networks in partIcular situations, where the 
Nash equilibrIum solution IS quite inefficIent and channel uncert81nty leads 
to reduced greedmess of users. 
I dedtcate thts thests to my early mentors. 
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Statement of Originality 
The folloWIng a.spects of this thesis are believed to be OrIgInal' 
• The extensIOn of the MIMO iteratIve waterfilling algOrIthm to broad-
band Gaussian Interference channels and the study of the effect of 
channel estImation errors on the performance of the MIMO iteratIve 
algOrIthm in Chapter 3. 
• The robust rate-maximizatlOn game formulation for frequency-selective 
8ISO Gaussian interference channels and the analysis of ItS equilIbrium 
(Theorem 4.2 on page 88) In Chapter 4 
• The analysis of the effect of channel uncertainty on the sum-rate In 
the robust SISO rate-maxnnization game for the two-user ca.se (The-
orem 5 1 on page 108 and Theorem 5 2 on page 111) in Chapter 5 
• The robust rate-maximizatIon game formulation for MIMO Gausslan 
interference channels in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Wireless communications technology has become an ubiquitous element of 
our society, rangmg from remote controllers and paging systems to cellular 
phones and wireless local area networks. With the advent of better battery 
technology and the relentless progress of Moore's law, today's portable de-
vices can support a great amount of processing power. This has led to an 
exponential increase m the usage of portable devICes such as cellular phones, 
tablet computers and laptops for data-intensive broadband internet applica-
tIons (FIgure 1 1) 
ThIS huge increase in demand has led to heavy congestion in the radio-
frequency (RF) spectrum allocated to these applicatIOns Issues such as call 
dropping, low download speeds and sporadIc availability of network access 
have become commonplace, partIcularly in areas WIth high denSIty of users. 
This was exemphfied at the launch of the popular iPhone 4 cell-phone last 
year, when Steve Jobs (CEO of Apple Inc.), who is famous for delivering 
Impeccable product-launches, had to briefly suspend the launch mIdway as 
the demonstration phone could not access the network. He finally had to 
1 
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Figure 1.1: Projected number of subscript ions (in billions) for mobile 
broadband and wired broad band internet connections globally [11 . 
request the 500+ members of the audience to turn off their WiFi devices in 
order to continue the demonstration [2). 
1.1 Radio frequency bands and spectrum management 
Wireless communication devices for various applications and services oper-
ate in specific pre-determined ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum called 
radio frequency (RF) bands. The radio waves used for communication are 
transmitted and received through antennas which transform electrical en-
ergy to rad io waves that propagate through the atmosphere from the source 
to the destination. Due to varying propagation characteristics of radio waves 
of different frequencies, specific applications are allocated specific RP bands. 
For instance, the RP spectrum allocation in the United States of Amer-
ica is presented in Figure 1.2. These allocations are determined by various 
Section 1.1. Radio frequency bands and spectrum management 3 
national and international regulatory bodies (e.g.: the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) in the USA and the Office of Communications 
(Of co m) in t he UK). 
When mult iple wireless devices operate in t he same environment , they 
often interfere with each other. Spectrum management is needed to control 
t he usage of RF spectrum in order to mitigate interference among wire-
less devices and services. The current practice for spectrum allocation by 
regulatory bodies is known as the command-and-control model [41. In this 
approach, the regulators make centralized decisions regarding spectrum al-
location and usage, often through an auctioning process commonly referred 
to as a spectrum auction. After a successfu l bid , a user /company is awarded 
the allocation , which is often valid for extended periods of time and over 
large geographical regions. While the majority of t he RF spectrum is man-
aged under t his scheme, a small region of the RF spectrum, known as the 
industrial , scientific and medical (ISM) band, is unlicensed and open to any 
device/application. Some of the technologies using these band are cord-
less telephony, bluetooth radio, wireless local area networking and radio-
frequency identification (RFID). 
The command-and-control model of spectrum management and alloca-
t ion enSllres interference-free operation for the licensed user as it is operating 
in the band exclUSively. Since most of the spectrum is already allocated 
to various applications (Figure 1.2), emerging wireless applications such 
as wireless broad band communications face an apparent spectrum scarcity. 
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Figure 1.2: A visual representation of t he congestion in radio spectrum allocation 
in t he United States of America; the detail is unnecessary, but can be found at [3]. 
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However, field studies on actual spectrum usage have shown that the cur-
rent spectrum management policy results in highly inefficient spectrum uti-
lization (Figure 1.3). TWs has led to the evolutIOn of new paradigms and 
technologies for future spectrum management models and wireless commu-
nicatIOn deVICes which aim to improve the efficiency of their own spectrum 
utilization and to exploit the mefficlency of licensed spectrum users. 
1.2 Emerging wireless paradigms and technologies 
The growing demand for high-throughput Wireless communicatIOn has led 
to the emergence of new paradigms and technologies as contenders for next-
generation wireless communicatIOn networks In this section, a few of these, 
namely cognitive radIO, dynamiC spectrum access, orthogonal frequency-
diVision multlplexing (OFDM) and multi-antenna systems are bnefly de-
scribed. 
1.2.1 Cognitive radio and dynamic spectrum access 
Cogmtive radio IS an emerging paradigm of Wireless communication In which 
an intelligent Wireless system utilizes information about the radio environ-
ment to adapt its operating characteristics in order to ensure reliable com-
munication and efficient spectrum utilization [6J The main goal of this 
paradigm is to enable the cognitive radio to exploit the inefficiently utilized 
licensed spectrum for its own communication needs without significantly af-
fectmg the licensed user. The band of RF spectrum that IS licensed to a user 
Section 12 Emergmg wireless paradigms and technologies 
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spectrum utilizatIon [5] 
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Figure 1.4- Concept of spectrum hole represented m power, time and 
frequency space wherein there is an opportumty for a cognitive radio 
to operate [7J. 
but is not utihzed by the licensed user at a particular time and location is 
called a spectrum hole (Figure 1 4) 
One of the key enablmg technologies for cognitive radio IS dynam,c spec-
trum access The overarchlllg idea behind dynamiC spectrum access IS to 
temporarily borrow unused spectrum from licensed users (spectrum holes) 
Without interfermg with their operatIOn [8]. Research on varIOus aspects of 
cognitive radio and dynanUc spectrum access has received a great deal of 
mterest in recent times [9--13] and will help design wireless communication 
systems of the future. 
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1.2.2 OFDM technology 
Orthogonal frequency-dIVIsIOn multiplexing (OFDM) is a frequency-division 
multlplexmg scheme developed to transmit multiple digital signals simulta-
neously over a large number of closely-spaced orthogonal sub-carners [14J. 
OFDM transmission is used for wideband digital communication, both wired 
and wireless, and has been adopted for a variety of applications, rangmg from 
digital televISion to wireless networking. 
OFDM technology has many advantages. It has a high spectral effi-
ciency and IS resilient to interference and multipath effects It can also 
easily adapt to severe channel conditions without complicated time-domain 
equalization and can be efficiently Implemented using the fast Fourier trans-
form However, OFDM technology is quite sensitive to Doppler shift and 
frequency-synchronization issues, despite which It has become the de-facto 
physical (PRY) layer broadband transmissIOn technology and is particularly 
advantageous for multiple access systems. 
1.2.3 Multi-antenna technology 
Multiple antennas at the receiver and/or transmitter of a wireless commu-
mcation system can be used to Improve link performance [15J. The term 
multiple-mput multiple-output (MIMO) IS used to descnbe systems which 
exploit such antenna diversity. MIMO technology can significantly improve 
the data throughput and coverage without additional bandwidth or trans-
mission power. This is because signals transffiltted from multiple antennas 
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experience differing multIpath fading and are receIved by multiple anten-
nas. The dIfferent multIpath signals can be combIned coherently to achieve 
higher data rates and/or lower bit-error rates by USIng clever signal process-
ing techniques However, thIs can signIficantly increase the complexity of 
the communicatIon system. 
1.3 Motivation 
The aforementioned technologies and paradIgms are mtegral features of to-
day's high performance networks and/or are strong contenders for wIreless 
networks of tomorrow. OFDM and MIMO technologIes are already exten-
sIvely used in wIreless networks through standards such as IEEE 802 11n and 
WIMAX They are also strong candidate technologies for the next-generation 
of wireless communication networks [16-18J, which will incorporate princi-
ples of cognItive radio and dynamic spectrum access [19,20J. 
A prominent feature of these paradigms IS the provision for greater free-
dom of action for the users in the network. In such a network, "Intelhgent" 
users actIvely and dynamIcally manage the resources and characteristIcs of 
their transceIvers, such as transmit power and bandWIdth, In order to op-
timize theIr commumcation performance in terms of various crIteria such 
as information rate, utIlIzed power and achIeved quahty-of-service (QoS). 
With the advent of cognItIve radio and dynamic spectrum access, multiple 
heterogenous wireless technologIes and standards of tomorrow are expected 
to function seamlessly in the same environment and RF spectrum [21J. In 
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such a setting, interference among the users l becomes a Critical Issue and 
precludes the traditional approach of interference mitigation through prede-
termmed non-overlapping frequency allocation (FDMA) due to sigruficant 
demands on coordmation among the users. ThiS form of centrahzed control 
determining the commulllcation parameters of users leads to heavy signalling 
overhead as mformation from all the users needs to be collected, processed 
and disseminated by the controller. 
The Issue of maxJmlzmg information rates of users m an interference 
charmel by optimizing the power spectral density of the transmitted signal 
under certam power constraints IS of mterest in this thesis The sum-rate 
maximization problem in a frequency-selective Gausslan interference charmel 
has been proved to be NP-hard [22J and the optimal solution of thIS problem 
is of the form of frequency diVISion multiple access (FDMA) [23J. Thus, a 
centralized solution to thiS problem not only reqUires informatIOn (in the 
fonn of channel state informatIOn and noise variances) from all users, but 
also is computahonally unattractive. 
The solution to these limitations lies in the framework of d,stnbuted algo-
nthms, which enable users of the network to compute their optimal solutions 
autonomously with limited (locally avrulable) informatIOn The analysis of 
such a system of multiple interactive autonomous mtelhgent users operatmg 
m the same environment falls well wlthm the purview of game theory, which 
ISuch a system With multo-user mterference m a frequency-selective medIUm (as 
seen in OFDM transmission) can be modelled as an mterference channe~ described 
in SectIOn 3.3 on page 44. 
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was devised to analyze and predict the outcome of situations where multi-
ple entities (typically people, companies and nations) interact. In addition, 
solutions from such a game-theoretic analysis can often be implemented as 
distributed algorithms. These factors make game theory an attractive tool 
for the design and analysIs of tomorrow's wireless communication networks 
Indeed, it has been shown that the problem of maxlmizmg informatIOn rates 
of users in an interference channel, which is of interest m this thesis, can be 
modelled as a noncooperative game [24]. 
However, a vast majority of game-theoretic solutions proposed for wire-
less networks in the current hterature, including the rate-maxlmization game, 
assumes perfect knowledge of channel state information, which is not pos-
sible in practice, where such information is estimated with a certain degree 
of uncertamty. This uncertainty could be introduced though several mecha-
nisms, such as estimatIOn errors, feedback quantization and latency between 
channel estimation and signal transmission. If these solutions are to be 
Implemented in practice, the effect of such uncertainty on the perfor-
mance of these game-theoretic solutions needs to be characterized 
and robust game-theoretic algorithms which perform satisfacto-
rily in spite of such uncertainty need to be designed and analyzed. 
This issue of uncertamty in the parameters of game-theoretic solutions is the 
central theme of thIS thesis 
In summary, the design of distributed algorithms based on ideas 
from game theory for maximizing the information rates of users 
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having limited transmit power in single-antenna and multi-antenna 
interference channels with uncertainty in channel state informa-
tion is the focus of this thesis. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The aforementioned approaches and issues are addressed over the following 
chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 2: Game Theory: Fundamentals. Nash Equilibrium and 
Robust Game Theory 
This chapter presents a brief descriptIOn of the game-theoretic concepts that 
are of interest In this thesis. The chapter begins With an introductIOn to 
game theory and the conditions needed for Its apphcatlOn in a given sce-
nario, descnbed In Section 2.1 on page 18. This IS followed by a discussion 
on strategic noncooperative games and the concept of Nash equihbrium in 
Section 2 2 on page 23 and the notion of equihbrium efficiency as a method 
to quantify the quality of the Nash equilibrium solution In Section 2.3 on 
page 25. 
In SectIOn 2.4 on page 28, a diSCUSSion on some of the limitatIOns of 
the Nash equihbrium concept and the traditional game-theoretic approach 
to the issue of uncertainty in games IS presented. Finally, the robust game 
model, which is a umon of Ideas from robust optimization theory and game 
theory, is introduced in Section 2.5 on page 30 as a suitable candidate for 
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resolvmg the issue of uncertainty m channel state mformation affectmg the 
performance of game-theoretic solutions. 
Chapter:3: Iterative Waterfilling Algorithms 
ThiS chapter presents a specmc game-theoretic solution and its associated 
conceptual and mathematical foundations within which the issue of channel 
uncertainty is investigated in thiS thesis. This includes results from contrac-
tion and fixed point theory, which addresses the formulation and character-
izatIOn of distributed algOrithms (Section 3.1 on page 35) and information 
theory, which mtroduce the waterfilling solutIOn as the optimal solution to 
the problem of rate-maxlmlzatlOn in a smgle-user context (Section 3 2 on 
page 40). Tills is followed by the deSCriptIOn of the Gausslan interference 
channel m the multi-user scenario and a review of the current literature usmg 
game theory to address the problem of rate-maximizatlon in this medium m 
Section 3 3 on page 44. 
The predommant game-theoretic solution, namely the Iterative water-
filling algorithm (IWFA) , to the problem of rate-maJQmization m smgle-
antenna frequency-selective Gausslan mterference channels and multi-antenna 
(MIMO) Gaussian interference channels are presented respectively in Sec-
tion 3.4 on page 49 and Section 3 5 on page 55 and extended to broadband 
MIMO Gaussian interference channels in Section 3 6 on page 63. 
Finally, in Section 3.7 on page 68, the effect of channel state mformation 
errors on the performance of the MIMO iterative waterfillmg algorithm is 
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Investigated, which demonstrates the need for robust solutIons presented in 
the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 4: Robust IWFA for SISO Frequency-Selective Systems 
In thIS chapter, the analytic framework for a robust formulation of the rate-
maximization game for Single-input Single-output (SISO) frequency-selectIve 
Gaussian Interference channels is presented. Section 4.1 on page 76 is a re-
vIew of the state-of-the-art in methods that address and investigate the is-
sue of channel state Information uncertainty in rate-maximlzation games for 
Gaussian Interference channels. The system under consIderation IS desCrIbed 
in SectIOn 4.2 on page 78. A dIStrIbution-free robust rate-maximlzation game 
based on the robust game model IS formulated in Section 4.3 on page 81. The 
optimal solution of each user in the form of a robust waterfilling operation 
IS derived and characterized in SectIOn 4.4 on page 83. 
In Section 4 5 on page 87, the equilibrIum solution of thIS game, termed 
the robust-opttmtzatton eqmMrtum, IS presented and shown to exist for possi-
ble channel values and initIalizatIons, and further, to be umque under certain 
suffiCIent conditions. A dIStributed algorithm to compute the equilibrium so-
lution iteratively is presented and proved to asymptotically converge when 
a unique equilibrium is guaranteed in SectIOn 4 6 on page 88. Finally, nu-
merIcal simulations to confirm the behaviour of the algorithm are presented 
In Section 4.7 on page 91, where an interestmg effect of increase in sum-rate 
WIth greater channel uncertainty IS observed, which merits further analYSIS. 
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Chapter 5: Sum-Rate Analysis in the Two-User Scenario 
This chapter is an analytIcal investigation of the improvement in sum-rate 
with greater channel uncertamty in the robust SISO rate-maximization game 
proposed in Chapter 4 for the two-user case To begin wIth, the effect of 
increasing channel uncertainty on the sum-rate and the price of anarchy of a 
simple two-frequency system are analyzed m Section 5.1 on page 107. Based 
on these results, conditions for improvement in the sum-rate and the prIce 
of anarchy of a system WIth asymptotically large number of frequencies with 
an increase In uncertainty are derIved in Section 5.2 on page 110. Finally, 
these results are supported USIng slmulations in SectIOn 5.3 on page 112. 
Chapter 6: Robust IWFA for MIMO Systems 
In thIS chapter, a robust rate-maxImization game in MIMO Gaussian inter-
ference channels in the presence of bounded channel uncertainty is developed. 
The system model for whIch the robust game is developed IS descrIbed in 
Section 6.1 on page 134. A robust MIMO rate-maximlzatlOn game for thIS 
system is formulated and shown to be a modified MIMO rate-maximizatIon 
game (SectIOn 3.5) In Section 6.2 on page 136. The robust-optimization 
eqUIlIbrIum for this game and an Iterative waterfilhng algorithm to compute 
It are presented, along with sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the 
eqUIlibrIUm and asymptotic convergence of the algorithm, in Section 6.3 on 
page 140. The behaviour of the algorithm under dIfferent settings is con-
firmed though numerIcal simulations in SectIOn 6 4 on page 144. 
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Chapter 7: Summary, Conclusions and Future Work 
The novel results of thIS thesis and theIr conclusions are summarized In 
Section 7 1 on page 150. The work presented in thIS theSIS could be extended 
in varIOus directions, some of which are descnbed In Section 7.2 on page 154. 
Chapter 2 
GAME THEORY-
FUNDAMENTALS, NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM AND ROBUST 
GAME THEORY 
The past decade has seen the increasing application of concepts from game 
theory In wireless communication systems to solve a variety of problems 
[25-31J. Game theory has been utilized to solve various resource alloca-
tions problems in different scenarios and the problems considered Involve 
bandwidth allocation, power control, medium access control, flow control, 
routing and pncing issues in wireless networks [32J Game theory has also 
been extensively applied in cognitive radIO and dynamic spectrum access, 
particularly to solve issues in spectrum management and spectrum shar-
ing [33-37J 
17 
Section 2 1 Introduction to game theory 18 
In thIs chapter, a brIef overview of game-theoretIc concepts relevant to 
this thesis is presented The chapter begins with an introduction to game 
theory and a brIef dIscussion on the classification of games This is followed 
by a description ofthe strategic noncooperatIve game model, the N ash eqUJ-
IIbrium and the notion of equilibrium efficiency. Finally, the robust game 
model is introduced as a way of moving beyond the concept of the N ash 
eqUJhbrIum in static noncooperative games having uncertainty m payoff func-
tIOns, with the marriage of ideas from robust optimization theory and game 
theory. 
2.1 Introduction to game theory 
Game theory is a collection of mathematical tools deSIgned for the analysIs 
of sItuatIOns where decISIOn-makers meet and interact. In such sItuations, 
the success of individual deCIsion-makers depends on the actIOns of others. 
Though game theory was developed to analyze and understand economic 
behaVIour [38,39J, the underlying concepts of game theory are far-reachmg 
and have seen applicatIOns m diverse fields such as biology, polItical science, 
mternatlOnal relations, computer SCIence, engmeerIng, social psychology, phi-
losophy and management. 
In its broadest sense, a game is a desCrIptIOn of strategic interaction 
among decision makers, termed as players. It speCIfies the constraints on 
the players when decldmg on a possible action, but does not state what 
action they decide to take. A solution concept of a game refers to a formal 
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rule that predicts the actions of the players when the game IS played These 
predictions are called solutzons and describe the action each player will select, 
which is called a strategy. The most common form of the solutIOn concept 
is the equlhbrlum concept. At an equilibrIUm, the various forces mfluencmg 
the game are balanced and the players will not change their strategies in the 
absence of external influences. 
Game theory is bUilt upon the theory of ratzonal chOIce, which assumes 
that the action decided by a player is at least as good as every other available 
actIOn. The players are also assumed to reason strategICally by taking into 
account the possible actions of other players while deciding their own actIOns. 
In order to apply game theory to analyze a given scenarIO, a few basiC 
requirements need to be satisfied. First of all, there must be well-defined 
deCision makmg processes III the scenario. Also, the deciSIOns from these 
processes should have a predictable Impact on performance. ThiS is typically 
achieved by clearly identifying the players of the game and specifying their 
preferences expliCitly through utlhty /payoff functions which are mappings 
from the set of possible actions to the profits dehvered. Furthermore, in order 
to ensure that the scenariO being modelled does not result in a triVial game, 
there must be multiple mteractwe decision makers and each deCision maker , 
must have multiple possible actIOns. The term "interactive" m thiS context 
indicates that the actions of any deciSIOn maker should have an impact on 
the actIOns of the others. In other words, the scenarIO being modelled as 
a game should not be a simple smgle-obJective optimizatIOn problem. In 
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most cases, havmg a multi-user scenario with a separate objective function 
for each user will be adequate for tills to be ensured. I 
Traditionally, game theory was developed in order to analyze and pre-
dict the outcomes of situations, particularly in economics, wherem multiple 
decision makers interacted, given their decision making processes. In a com-
municatIOns network context, this implies that applying game theory in this 
fasillon will help to predict the performance of networks and to analyze the 
effect of varIOUS network parameters on the network performance when the 
users are operating under a certain protocol or utllizmg a specified algorithm 
In engineering (and particularly in communications), there is a great 
range of decIsIOn making processes and possible actions that could eXist m a 
certain scenario (system), unlike in the case of economics or political sCience 
where people, companies and nations are being modelled Further, in the 
case of economics or political sCience, the game-theorist has little control or 
influence on the actIOns of the set of people, companies or nations bemg mod-
elled and game theory is primarily an analytical tool in such cases However, 
there could be certam specific decision making processes and ranges of ac-
tions whose outcome predicted by game theory is more desirable than others, 
which indicates that game theory could also be used as a design tool. In a 
IThis does not necessarily mean that game theory is only apphcable in multi-user 
problems In some cases, inventmg fictitIOus users playmg an imagmary game may 
be useful III achieving a deSired solutIOn For mstance, a smgle-user robust (worst-
case) power allocation problem m MIMO channels With no channel information or 
statistiCS has been analyzed by modelling the problem as a user vs maliCious-nature 
game [40J . In thIS case, the mteraction between the user and nature occurs through 
the vsrymg levels of receiver noise of the user 
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communIcations network settmg, this translates to designing (engmeermg') 
the protocols or algorithms utilized by the users in the network in order to 
achieve specific predetennined perfonnance targets at the user and/or net-
work level. 2 It IS this "engineering" perspective of applying game theory as 
a design tool that IS of great interest in the field of Wireless communications 
and networkmg 
2.1.1 Types of games 
A game is a mathematical model of mteractmg deCision makers and has 
three basic components [42]: 
• a set of players 
• a set of actIOns (for each player) 
• a set of preferences (for each player) 
The set of actIOns of each player IS called the set of admtsstble stmtegtes 
or the stmtegy space The preferences of each player are typically specified 
using payoff/uttltty functtons whICh explicitly deSCribe the relation between 
actions and profits. 
There is a huge diversity in game-theoretic approaches and classlfymg 
this seemingly beWildering variety of games under a unIversal classification 
"ThIS IS qmte slDular to the concept of reverse engineering [41J, where the goal is 
to discover /reinvent the process that resulted III a solUtion/product, gIven the final 
solution/product, through the analysis of its structure, function and operation. 
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scheme is not easy. This has led to many classificatIOns of game-theoretic 
methods along different criteria, some of which are: 
• Cooperative and noncooperative games: If the players III a game 
are aiming to mutually benefit by reliably cooperating with each other, 
this leads to cooperative games On the other hand, If the users are 
aimmg to improve only their own selfish objectives, the game is srud 
to be noncooperative. 
• Static and dynamic games: These are also known as strategw 
games and extenswe games, respectively. In static games, all play-
ers make their decisions sunultaneously (or if at different pomts in 
time, without knowing other players' strategies), whereas in dynanuc 
games, there is a temporal component where the players may take 
turns to make decisions or play the game repeatedly and try to take 
advantage of knowmg the history of the game. 
• Zero-sum and non-zero-sum games: In zero-sum games (and 
more generally, constant-sum games), the total available resources m 
the game IS constant and unaffected by the players' actions, with the 
gain by any player being offset by a correspondmg loss of others How-
ever, in non-zero-sum games, the total available resources in the game 
is not constant and depends on the strategies of the players In such 
cases, a careful design of the game may lead to Improvement of many 
or all the payoffs of the players m the game. 
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• Symmetric and asymmetric games: In symmetric games, all the 
players have identIcal payoff functIOns and strategy-spaces and the 
payoff for a particular strategy is independent of the identity of the 
player. However, in asymmetric games this IS not the case, where 
the payoff functions and/or strategy-spaces are non-IdentIcal and the 
payoffs of the players are non-identical. 
The games considered III this thesis are statIc noncooperatIve asymmet-
ric non-zero-sum games. In the following section, a brief description of the 
strategic noncooperatIve game and Its solution concept, the Nash eqUl1ib-
rium, IS presented. 
2.2 Static noncooperative game - Nash equilibrium 
This section formalizes the strategic noncooperatIve game model and the 
defirution of the Nash eqUlhbrium solution concept 3 
Consider the following static noncooperatIve game, r,g. 
• Set of players: n = {I, ... ,Q} 
• Set of admisSible strategies (Strategy-space)' Aq '" {} 'Iq E n. 
• Payoff (Utility) functIOns: Uq(aq, a_q ) : Al x ... X Aq ...... IR 'Iq E n 
3The discussion presented here has been !mllted to pure .trateg,es, I e., actions 
that are deternllUlstic. The notIOns presented here have been extended to mIXed 
.trategtes, where the pure strategies are associated WIth a probability of apphca,. 
tion. However, as all the games discussed in this thesIS have pure strategies, game-
theoretic concepts lllVO!Vlllg nuxed strategies are beyond the scope of thIS thesis 
Refer to [42,43J among others for further information on mixed strategies 
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where each player IS assumed to know the strategy-space and payoff func-
tions of every other player. This knowledge is not always necessary in all 
noncooperative games. For instance, in the robust MIMO rate-maximization 
game analyzed m Section 6 2 on page 136, the players do not expliCit share 
any informatIOn. 
The solution concept of thiS game is the famous Nash equ,ltbrlum, based 
on the concepts mtroduced by Nobel PTlze wmner John Nash in [44,45J The 
notIOn of a Nash eqUilibrium is presented in the followmg result· 
PROPOSITION 2.1. Gwen the game <.1, the Jotnt strategy a* £ [at, ... , aQJ ,s 
a Nash equ,ltbrlum 'I 
(22.1) 
In other words, no smgle player can profit by unilaterally deviating from 
a Nash eqUilibrIUm An alternate interpretatIOn of the Nash eqUilibrIUm is 
through the concept of best response strateg,es A best response strategy of 
a player IS the action (or set of actions) which results m the most favourable 
outcome for a player, given other players' strategies. At the Nash eqUilib-
rIum, each player's strategy is a best response to all other strategies m the 
eqUilibrium Thus, the Nash eqUilibrium of a game can be said to be a 
joint-best-response strategy of the players 
The question of whether a given game has any eqUilibrium or not is one 
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that has been extensively investigated over the years Most of these are bUilt 
upon various fixed point theorems,4,5 and present variOUS conditions under 
which a game Will be guaranteed to have an equilibrium (Refer to [50] for 
a detailed treatment on the topic). A further question to be addressed IS 
whether there IS a unique N ash equilibrium in a game, and if so, ways to 
compute it. This IS because the equilibrium solution concept only indicates 
that if the players are imtlalized with a Nash equilibrium solution, then they 
will continue to remain there. It does not specify the dynamics of the game, 
and how long the players may take to converge to an equilibrium, If they 
converge at all 
2.3 Equilibrium efficiency 
The "joint-best-response" mterpretation of the Nash eqUilibrIUm IS of sig-
nificant mterest when dealing with distributed optimization It implies that 
each player IS at a locally optimal solutIOn which can be computed by a 
distributed algorithm whose convergence properties could be characterized 
and analyzed. This leads to the idea of compett/we optzmallty, where each 
player m a competitive enVironment settles down to a (locally) optimal sta-
ble solution. The tenn "optlmallty" here IS slightly fallacious and this Idea 
'It is mterestmg that the eqUivalence between the Nash eqUlhbrium and the 
concept of a fixed pomt is only mentioned m passmg, If at all, m most general 
textbooks on game theory, when John NMh's work IS actually buut on thls mter-
pretation, using Kakutani's fixed pomt theorem [46] in hIS seminal paper [44] to 
prove the existence of an equilibrium 
5 A few of the important fixed pomt theorems in game theory are the ones by 
Brouwer [47], Lefschetz [48], Hopt [49] and Kakutani [46]. 
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should be applied with caution. Tills IS because the emphasis m such an 
approach is on achlevmg a stable (statIOnary) situation in the game with 
all the players settling to a single action each, rather than an emphasis on 
optimizing the total (or mruvidual) utility of the players in the game. In 
fact, there is no guarantee that such a decentralized noncooperative solution 
will yield a utility as good as one from a centralized opbmization approach. 
This leads to the concept of equzMnum ejfic,ency which tries to quantify 
thiS ISsue and measure the trade-off between achieving decentralized control 
and having globally optimal solutions. 
The popular measures of equihbrium effiCiency are as follows· 
1. Social welfare 
2. Pareto opbmallty 
3. Pflce of anarchy/stability 
2.3.1 Social welfare 
Given the jomt strategy a ~ [ab ... , aQ], the social welfare of game <§ is 
defined as the sum of all the utilities of the players 
Q 
w(a) = EUq(aq,a_q) (2.3.1) 
q=l 
When the payoff functions of the players are the information rates of the 
users (as is the case in this thesis), the social welfare IS eqUivalent to the 
sum-rate of the system. 
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2.3.2 Pareto optimality 
A solution IS Pareto optimal if there IS no possible way to improve the payoff 
of a (non-empty) subset of players Without leavmg any other player worse-off. 
PROPOSITION 2.2. Gwen the game <,1, a Jomt strategy a' £ [aj, . . , aQ] 's 
sa,d to Pa.-eto optimal 'I there does NOT exist any a E AI x .. x Aq such 
that 
Uta) > U(a') (232) 
The set of solutions wluch are Pareto optimal forms the boundary of the 
joint-utilIty region of the game and is known as the Pareto frontier [51]. 
2.3.3 Price of anarchy and price of stability 
The concept of prIce of anarchy, introduced in [52], aims to measure the 
"prIce of uncoordinated individual utility-maxmuzing decisions". Together 
with the prIce of stability, it helps quantify the trade-off between having 
distrIbuted algOrIthms and optimal social welfare. 
The price of anarchy IS defined as the ratio between the objective function 
value at the socially optimal solution and the worst objective function value 
at any equilIbrIUm of the game [53]. The price of stability is defined as the 
ratio between the objective function value at the socially optimal solutIOn 
and the best objective functIOn value at any eqUilIbrium of the game [53]. 
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Thus, in game 'i1, 
max w(a) 
P A aEA o = --""'."--~(~) illln w a 
aEAN'" 
max w(a) 
Pos = ....::;aE""A.:......----,.-, 
max w(a) 
aEANE 
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(23.3) 
where A ~ Al X ••• x Aq is the joint strategy space, ANE is the set of 
Nash equihbrlUm solutions and w(a) is the social welfare of the game as 
defined in (2.3 1). Note that PoA ;::: PoS ;::: 1 and that a lower prIce of 
anarchy indicates a more efficient game. Thus, price of anarchy and price 
of stability help quantify the worst-case and best-case equihbrium efficiency 
respectively In games wIth umque Nash equihbrlUm solutions, such as the 
ones consIdered in this thesis, the price of anarchy and stability are Identical. 
2.4 Moving beyond Nash equilibrium - robust game theory 
The N ash equilibrIUm concept discussed in the previous section is one of the 
cornerstones of noncooperatIve game theory and has been utilized to solve 
a great many problems III a diverse range of applicatIOns. However, the 
concept of Nash equihbrIum is not wIthout limItations As seen ill the pre-
vious section, the Nash equihbrium concept generally provides a distrIbuted 
solution at the cost of eqUlhbrium efficiency. However, It suffers from scala-
bility Issues In games wIth large number of players and large actIOn spaces, 
the computatIOn of the Nash eqUIlibrium solution and the verIfication of 
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the condItions for eXIstence and/or uniqueness often become inefficient or 
even Intractable. Furthermore, these costly computatIOns to evaluate the 
equihbrlUm solution may not even be Pareto optimal. 
The scalablhty issue is even more complicated in large games as they 
typically yield large number of eqUlhbria and could result in a high prIce 
of anarchy. In such a scenario, it is qUIte dIfficult to predict which eqUIhb-
rium IS achieved or to ensure that a specIfic subset of equihbria is achieved 
as dIfferent initializatlOns could lead to different eqUlhbria. Techmques to 
identify and select an appropriate equihbrium in such cases lead to the the-
ory of eqUlhbrlUm selection [54]. The ISsue of multiple equihbria IS not of 
importance in this thesis as the focus of the methodologies here are in en-
suring a unique equihbrium and ways to compute it easily in a dIstributed 
fashion, which is presented In Section 3.1 on page 35. Scalablhty issues In 
large games are beyond the scope of this thesIs and IS a possIble avenue of 
future research. 
Another liIllltation of the concept of Nash equihbrlUm is that it assumes 
complete knowledge of all the players' actions by each player and that these 
actions and the payoffs of each player are known accurately. However, this 
might not be possIble In many cases and the players are often uncertain 
about some aspects of the game. Uncertainty In the payoffs of the play-
ers is of particular interest in thIS thesIS, as perfect knowledge of channel 
state information is not available in wireless networking games. Thus, alter-
nate equilibrium concepts whIch model the presence of uncertainty need to 
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considered. 
The traditional game-theoretic solution to the uncertalllty Issue IS Harsanyi's 
Bayesian game model [55-57] whICh is essentially analogous to the stochas-
tic programming approach [51] to uncertalllty III data-sets in optlllllzatlOn 
theory. In the Bayesian game model, each player aims to maximize the 
expected payoff, given the full pnor probability distnbutlOn of all the pa-
rameters with uncertainty This model assumes that all the players have 
the same prior probability dlstnbution and IS known to all the players. Al-
though thiS model has been extended to relax the asSumptIOns of common 
pnor and common knowledge, the drawback of thiS approach is that It IS dif-
ficult, in practice, to estimate the pnor probability rustnbutions accurately 
and often leads to complicated probability distnbutions which results in the 
analysis of the game being intractable. Thus, It is desirable to move to novel 
"dlstnbution-free" game models, which are defined to be Illdependent of the 
prior probability distributions of the parameters with uncertalllty. 
2.5 Robust game model 
The robust game model, proposed independently III [58,59], incorporates the 
concept of robust optimization [60], which is independent of the probability 
distnbution of the parameters with uncertainty, into the framework of static 
noncooperative game theory. This approach models incomplete-information 
games as dlStnbution-free robust games where the players use a worst-case 
robust optimization approach to counter bounded payoff uncertainty. The 
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solutIOn of this robust game model is a distribution-free eqUilibrium concept 
called the robust-optlmlzatzon equIlibrIUm 6 In [58J, the robust game model 
is proposed for finite N-person games with linear payoff functions and un-
certainty in the parameters of the payoff functIOn. The robust game model 
proposed in [59J is for two-person games (bimatnx games) With linear pay-
off functions and uncertainty in the actions of the opposmg player and each 
player's payoff functIOn parameters This model has been extended m [61J to 
N-person games with nonlmear payoff functions, where It IS reformulated as 
second-order cone complementary problems m order to solve certain classes 
of games The work presented m this thesis IS based on the robust game 
model in [58J. 
In worst-case robust optimization [51J, the parameters are assumed to 
belong to "uncertainty sets" (set of all possible parameter values), and the 
objective function is optimized for the worst-case parameter value (Le., the 
parameter value which results in the worst objective function value). In the 
robust game model, each player formulates a best response as the 
solution to a worst-case optimization problem. It is to be noted that 
the players apply a worst-case perspective only to the uncertam parameters 
that define their own payoff functions, given the actions of the other players, 
and that the actIOns of other players are beyond the scope of consideration of 
each player. In other words, the optimization performed by each player is for 
6The eqUIlibrium concept IS called "robust Nash eqUllibnum" ill [59] and "robust-
optimization eqUlhbrium" in [58]. In thIS thesIS, the term robust-optimIZation equi-
hbnum is used exclusively in order to hlghhght the fact that thIS concept has Its 
roots ill robust optimizatIOn theory 
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worst-case payoff functIon parameters (presumably determined by "nature") 
and not for worst-case actIOns of the other players. 
If it is commonly known to all players that each one of them is adopt-
10g the above robust-optimization approach to payoff function uncertainty, 
then It is possIble for the players to mutually predict each other's behavIOur, 
similar to the complete-informatIOn game whose solutIOn is the Nash equi-
hbrlum.7 The players reach an equihbrlUm when their mutual predictions 
coincide and this leads to the notion of the robust-optimization eqUlhbrium 
This robust game approach IS utIlized in Chapters 4 and 6 to formulate 
a robust rate-maxmllzation game m the presence of bounded channel uncer-
tainty III SISO frequency-selective and MIMO Gaussian interference channels 
(For a discussIOn on Gausslan interference channels, refer to SectIOn 3 3 on 
page 44). 
2.6 Summary 
ThIs chapter presented an overvIew of the various concepts and methodolo-
gies from game theory that are of interest in the thesIs. A brief introduction 
to game theory and the underlying assumptions needed to apply game the-
ory were dIscussed. Tills was followed by a review of some of the commouly 
'Smce the players of the complete-mformation noncooperatIve game are ratIonal 
and know the payoffs and action-space of each other, each player can compute the 
best responses of every other player, which will help predIct the actIons of the 
other users Based on these predictIOns, each player formulates a best response 
strategy The Nash eqmhbrium is the set of all mutually-comcldmg predictIOns of 
the players. ThlS Idea may not be not straightforward to apply in practice, where 
all the informatIon may not be avallable and multiple equllibria could eXIst. 
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observed types of games FolIoWlllg thIS, the strategic noncooperatIve game 
model and the N ash equilibrium solutIOn concept were formally defined and 
explallled. The concept of equilibrium efficIency and measures to quantify 
it were then presented. The subsequent section elaborated some of the llllll-
tations of the N ash equilibrIUm and revIewed the traditIOnal game-theoretic 
approach to address the issue of uncertainty. Flllally, the concept of robust 
game theory as an amalgamatIOn of approaches from robust optimIzation 
theory and game theory was explored 
Chapter 3 
ITERATIVE WATERFILLING 
ALGORITHMS 
This chapter presents the conceptual foundations and specific game-theoretic 
problem formulations on wluch the contributions of this thesIS are based 
The chapter starts wIth a brief overview of relevant results in contraction 
mappings and fixed POInt theory This IS followed by a brief summary of clas-
sical single-user waterfilling solutions. Next, the issue of rate-maximization 
in multi-user Gaussian interference channels is considered and the predom-
inant game-theoretic approach to competitive rate-maxInuzation In SIngle 
antenna and multi-antenna Gausslan Interference channels is outlIned. The 
effect of channel estimation errors on the performance of this method IS then 
Investigated, setting the stage for the robust solutions proposed in this thesis 
in subsequent chapters. FInally, a short appendix on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker 
condItions is included for completeness. 
34 
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3.1 Contraction and fixed point theory 
In this sectIOn, some of the central concepts Involved in solving nonlinear 
problems using dlstnbuted iterative algorithms are summarized (Refer to [62J 
for a rigorous treatment of the tOPIC). The key motIvation behind using these 
well-studIed analytical tools lIes In the interpretatIOn of the Nash eqUIlIbrIUm 
as a fixed POInt and the representatIOn of the waterfilling functIon as an 
EuclIdean projection, enablIng its interpretation as a contraction mapping. 
3.1.1 Existence and uniqueness of a fixed point 
Let F : X 1-+ X be any mapping from a subset X £:; IRn to itself which is 
assocIated to a dynamic system descnbed by 
x(n + 1) = F(x(n)), nE 1\1+ = {0,1,2, ... }, (3 1 1) 
where x(n) E IRn is the state varIable vector at discrete-time n, with x(O) E 
IRn. If this mapping has the property 
IIF(x) - F(y) 11 :5 allx - YII, v x,y E X, (3.12) 
with 11·11 being some norm and Q being a constant in the interval [0,1), then 
such a mapping is called a contractwn mapptng. The scalar a is called the 
modulus ofF A mapping F: X 1-+ Y where X,Y C IRn that satisfies (3 1.2), 
is also called a contraction mapping, even if X of y. 
Any vector x* E X satisfyIng x* = F(x*) is called a fixed pomt of the 
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mappmg and the relation (3.1.1) can be seen as an Iterative algorithm to 
compute such a fixed pomt. ThiS is possible because x' is a fixed pomt If F 
is continuous at x' and the sequence {x{ n)} converges to x'. 
The following result provides the conditions for the existence and unique-
ness of such a fixed point [63]' 
THEOREM 3.1. Gwen the dynamtc system m (3.1.1) unth F : X I-> X and 
X ~ Rn, 
Existence: If X ts nonempty, convex and compact}, and F tS a contmuous 
mappmg, then there extsts some x' such that x' = F{x'); 
Uniqueness: If X ts closed and F tS a contractton mappmg m some vector 
norm 11 . 11, unth modulus a E [0,1), then the fixed pomt of F tS umque. 
It IS noteworthy that the conditIOns in Theorem 3.1 are only sufficient 
conditIOns for the existence and uniqueness of a fixed pomt of a dynamic 
system. Further, thiS result, more specifically the contractIOn mappmg, is 
norm-dependent. It is possible for mappings to be contractive under some 
norm and yet fail to be a contraction under a different norm. Thus, the 
chOice of a suitable norm is critical in the application of thiS theorem On the 
other hand, this flexibility III the choice of norm could lead to a more varied 
characterizatIOn of sufficient conditIOns for the existence and uniqueness of 
the fixed point of the mapping under different norms. 
I A subset of the Euchdean space Rn is called compact If it is closed and bounded. 
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3.1.2 Convergence of distributed algorithms to a fixed point 
The iterative algorithm described by x := F{x) of dimension n can be trans-
formed into a distributed algorithm whose components can be computed 
locally (at drlferent times, if necessary) by SUitably partitioning the system.2 
LetthepartltlOnofxbex = {XJ, •.. ,XQ)with:xq E \Rn. andnl+··+nQ = n 
such that F = {Fq}~l' with each Fq : Xq ..... Xq such that X = XIX·· ·xXQ, 
with each Xq c:;; \Rn •. According to this partition, the block-maxinIum norm 
on \Rn is defined as 
(3 1 3) 
where 11 Ilq is any vector norm on \Rn. for each q The mapping F IS called 
a block-contraction with modulus Cl< E [0,1) If it is a contractIOn in the 
block-maximum norm with modulus Cl<. 
Thus, the dlstnbuted implementation of the Iterative algOrithm (3.1.1) 
can be written as 
Xq = Fq{x), v q = 1, . ,Q. (3.1.4) 
The fixed pomt of F, i.e., x* = F{x*) is equivalent to computing the fixed 
point of each component locally, 
v q= 1, ... ,Q. (3.15) 
2Smce the jomt admISsible strategy set of the games m this theSIS is a Cartesian 
product of the set of admisSible strategies of each player, the results presented here 
are hmited to mappmgs whose domam can be written as a Cartesian product of 
lower dunenslOnaI sets 
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Let xq(n) be the value of the qth component at time n. Let the discrete 
set 'Il' ~ N+ = {I, 2, ... } be the set of times at which one or more of the 
components are updated and 'Il'q be the set of time Instants n when the 
component xq(n) is updated. Further, the most recent values of the other 
components may not be available dUring the computatIOn of x,; thus, when 
nE'Il'q, 
Xq(n + 1) = Fq( Xl (rf(n», ... , Xq-!(ri_l(n», 
Xq+1{ri+1 (n», ... , xQ{r~(n»), 
(316) 
where rl(n) is the time of the most recent value of component r available to 
user q at time n. 
DIfferent update order and scheduling of the components of a distributed 
algorithm lead to dIfferent classes of algorithms The most common of these 
are: 
Jacobi scheme: All components (XI, ... ,xq) are updated sImultaneously, 
via the mapping F. 
Gauss-Seidel scheme: All components (XI, ... ,xQ) are updated sequen-
tlally, one after the other, via the mapping F. 
Totally asynchronous scheme: The components (Xl, ... , xq) are updated 
fully asynchronously, Le., III no particular order or even with the same 
frequency, and the computatIOn of some components may Involve the 
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use of outdated values of other components.3 
The update order is of particular importance in the design of distributed 
algorithms The convergence properties of the same mappmg may differ sig-
nificantly across different update schemes, possibly convergmg at different 
rates, to different fixed-points or even not convergmg at all. The Gauss-
Seidel and J acobi schemes are special cases of the totally asynchronous 
scheme. The algorithm model described and characterized in this sectIOn 
is totally asynchronous, which is the most general case of the classes de-
sCribed above, and thus most useful to help characterize a larger class of 
algorithms. 
The followmg weak assumptIOns are made for each component q for the 
system to be totally asynchronous. 
1. The system is causal. 
(31 7) 
2 Out-dated mfonnatlOn IS eventually purged. 
(3.1.8) 
3 No component fails to update Its value eventually as time n progresses. 
111'1 =00 (319) 
3VanatlOns of this scheme, such as having constraints on maxunum tolerable 
delay, leads to a class of part.ally asynchronous algOrithms. 
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These assumptions are generally satisfied m any practical Implementa-
tion of distrIbuted algorithms. The sufficient condItion for convergence of 
a totally asynchronous distnbuted algorithm as descrIbed in this section is 
given in the followmg theorem [63]: 
THEOREM 32. Gwen the dynamw system In (3.1.1) W'tth the mapping F = 
{Fq}~=1 : X ...... X wtth X = XI x .. x XQ, tf the mapping F tS a block-
contracttOn W'tth modulus a E [0, 1), then the totally asynchronous algo1'1.thm 
based on the mapping F asymptottcally converges to the umque fixed potnt 
of F for any set of tmttal condttwns In X and updating schedule. 
3.2 Waterfilling: classical results - single-user systems 
In this section, the core concepts m mformation theory which led to the 
development of waterfillmg as a solutIon to rate-maximlzation problems are 
presented. 
Many common communication channels are modelled as a Gausslan 
channel, which is a time-dIscrete channel that models the nOIse at the re-
ceiver as an addItIve Gausslan random variable, 
y=x+n, (3.2.1) 
where x is the data transmitted m the current time-slot, y is the SIgnal re-
ceived and n is the complex noise drawn from a cIrcularly symmetric complex 
Gaussian distnbutlOn of zero -mean and varIance (12 
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If the average power constraint for transmission IS P, then the capacity 
of the Gausslan channel wIth noise varIance (72 is gIven by [64J 
c = ~ log (1 + ;) nats/transmission. (3.2.2) 
3.2.1 Parallel Gaussian channels 
Now consider N independent Gaussian channels which transmit data in par-
allel with a common power constraint, P. This channel models a wideband 
non-white addItIve Gaussian nOIse chaIDlel, where each parallel component 
represents a different frequency. Let p § [P(l), ... ,p(N)J where p(k) IS the 
power allocated to the kth channel and (72(k) be the variance of the addItIve 
Gaussian noise in the kth channel The goal is to allocate the power across 
the dIfferent channels in order to maJ{1mize the overall mformatIon rate The 
solution to this rate-m=m'zatwn problem, known as waterjillmg, is gIven 
by the followmg result [64J: 
PROPOSITION 3.1. The solutwn to the optim,zatlOn problem 
max 
p 
N ( p(k) ) ti log 1 + (72(k) 
st p(k);:::O, 
N 
LP(k) = P, 
k=I 
(32.3) 
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D Power allocated 
. 1/Noise variance 
Figure 3.1: A typical waterfilling solut ion for parallel Gaussian channels 
showing the inverse noise variance levels and optimal power allocations 
for each channeL 
is given by 
(3.2.4) 
where J.' is chosen suitably to satisfy I:f=lP(k) = P , with (x)+ £ max(O,x). 
A typical solution is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The reason for the term 
"waterfiIJing" is evident from the figure. If the inverses of the noise variances 
are assumed to be represented by the topography of the bottom of a vessel 
and the total power to be allocated by a certain amount of water, then the 
waterfillillg solution indicates that the optimal power allocation across the 
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channels is gIven by the depth of the water when the water IS poured into 
the vessel. The water level is reflected in the parameter /1-. 
3.2.2 MIMO Gaussian channel 
The Gaussian channel model can be extended to describe single-user sys-
tems wIth multIple transmitter and/or receIver antennas. Let nT and nR be 
the number of transmItter and receiver antennas respectively. The MIMO 
Gausslan channel is given by 
y=Hx+n (3 2.5) 
where yE CnRx1 IS the signal at the receIver, x E CnTx1 is the transmitted 
sIgnal, H E cnRxnT IS the (nonsingular) channel matrix and n E CnRx1 is 
the receIver noise, which IS assumed to be a zero-mean circularly symmetric 
complex Gaussian vector with the covariance matrIX I nR • 
The observed information rate for this system is given by [641 
(3.26) 
where Q ~ E{xxH } is the covariance matrix of the transmitted signal If 
the total power available is P, the rate-maximizing power allocation is given 
by the following result [651: 
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PROPOSITION 3.2. The 80lutwn to the ophm,zation problem 
'8 g,ven by 
S. t Qt 0, 
Th(Q) = P, 
Q* = U (ILl - D-1) + U H 
where U and D are calculated from the e,gendecompo8,tzon 
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(3.2.7) 
(3.28) 
(3.2.9) 
Thus, for MIMO Gausslan channels, the optimal power allocation is to 
perform waterfilhng along "spatial modes" of the channels, as suggested by 
its elgendecomposltion. 
3.3 Gaussian interference channel - multi-user systems 
In an environment with multiple users, the previous two models break down 
This IS because the channels of different users are no longer independent, and 
transmissIOn by one user causes mterference to the others. Such a scenario 
is modelled as a Gaussian interference channel (GIC). In this model, the 
interference caused by other channels is modelled as an additive Gausslan 
noise in addition to the usual receiver noise. When there are many paral-
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lel Gaussian mterference channels, the resulting wideband system IS called 
a vector Gaussian mterference channel. The vector Gausslan interference 
channel could be frequency-flat or frequency-selectwe in nature.4 
The capacity region of the Gaussian interference channel is an open prob-
lem m mformatlOn theory [64] and has been an area of active research [66-70]. 
A myopic approach where each user mdependently and simultaneously per-
forms classiCal waterfilling [64] based only on Its own channel state infor-
mation (CSI) without taking the interference caused by other users into 
account will be inefficient and unstable when the cross-channel gams are 
not small enough that the mterference caused is negligible. The alternate 
approach of modelling the rate-maJ{lmization problem as a single sum-rate 
maximization problem involving all the users and computed by a centralized 
controller, leads to a non-convex optimizatIOn problem and has been shown 
to be strongly NP-hard [22]. 
The focus in this thesis is on systems where the variOUS users act with 
minimal coordmation, wluch precludes the use of multi-user coding/decodmg 
and mterference-cancelation techmques. This is of interest because practical 
systems have significant hmitations on decoder compleXity, slgnallmg and 
coordmation among users. Under these constramts, multi-user interference 
is treated as noise and the design of the transmissIOn strategy reduces to 
finding the optimum power allocation for each user. Due to the nature 
'In thiS thesis, It is assumed that the various users m the vector Gausslan mterfer-
ence channel (the frequency-selective Gaussian mterference channel, in particular) 
aresmgle-antenna (SISO) systems, unless specifically stated 
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of competition and interdependent performance, game theory provIdes an 
excellent set of tools to analyze this problem. 
3.3.1 Competitive rate-maximization in the Gaussian interference 
channel 
Cooperative and noncooperative game theory have both been extensively 
applied to analyze power control problems III wireless networks [71-75]. Co-
operative game-theoretic approaches to the problem of power control in WIre-
less networks have been surveyed in [76-78] The distnbuted power control 
problem for both single-channel and multi-channel wireless networks has 
been characteriZed using supermodular game theory in [79,80]. Coalition, 
coordlllatlOn and Nash bargaming theory for resource allocatIOn III interfer-
ence channels have be investigated in [81-86]. 
In this thesis, the noncooperative scenario where the users are competing 
against one another and aiming to maxtIDlze their own information rates is 
considered. ThIS approach transforms the centralized multi-objective opti-
mization problem into a set of mutually coupled competitive single-objective 
optimization problems This competitive rate-maxtmization problem can be 
modelled as a strategic noncooperative game The Nash equilibnum [42] 
of thiS game can be achieved via a dlStnbuted waterfilling algonthm where 
each user performs waterfilling by considenng the multi-user interference as 
an additIve coloured noise. 
The seminal work on competitive rate-maximization [24] has used a 
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game-theoretIc approach to desIgn a decentrahzed algorithm for two-user 
dynamic power control in a digital subscriber line (DSL) environment mod-
elled as a frequency-selective Gausslan mterference channel. This work 
has proposed a sequential IteratIve waterfilling algorithm for reaching the 
N ash eqUlhbrium in a distributed manner. A N ash equihbrium of the rate-
maximization game Imphes that given that the power allocations of other 
users IS constant, no user can further increase the achieved mformatJOn rate 
umlaterally. A vector power control problem for frequency-flat Gaussian in-
terference channels has been presented in [87]. The issue of multiple Nash 
eqUlhbria occurring in the presence of strong mterference has been investi-
gated in [88]. Analysis of the sequentIal iterative waterfillmg algorithm for 
an arbItrary number of users using a hnear complementary problem formula-
tion has been presented m [89]. Sufficient condJtions for global convergence 
of an asynchronous iterative waterfillmg algorithm by formulatmg the wa-
terfillmg function as a piecewise alline functIon have been presented in [90]. 
A matrix game formulation for competitive rate-maxJmlzatlOn in frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channels, along WIth a novel mterpretatJOn of 
the waterfilhng function as an Euchdlan prOjection of a vector onto a convex 
set have been presented in [91-93]. The convergence properties of the itera-
tive waterfilling algorithm to multIple Nash equihbria m flat-fadmg Gaussian 
interference channels under drlferent levels of mterference and dJfferent up-
date strategies have been mvestigated in [94-96] and WIth sequential update 
strategy m frequency-selective GaussJan interference channels m [97] 
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An early work, [98], has looked into waterfilllng algorithms for MIMO 
interference systems, but Without any analytical results on the existence of 
an equilibrIUm and global convergence of the algorithm. The different ap-
proaches in [89,90,93] for the iterative waterfillmg algorithm m frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channels have been umfied under the formu-
lation of the waterfilling function as a Euclidean projection and extended 
to MIMO Gausslan interference channels With square (nonsingnlar) chan-
nels In [63]. A complete characterization of the MIMO rate-maximizatlOn 
game and the MIMO waterfilllng algorithm for arbitrary channel matrices 
has been investigated in [99]. This has been extended to the MIMO cognitive 
radio scenario In [100]. 
The subsequent sections present an overview of the rate-maximizatlOn 
game for frequency-selective and MIMO Gaussian Interference channels, 
along With the sufficient conditions for the eXIStence and uniqueness of the 
Nash equilibrium and convergence of the Iterative waterfilling algorithm to 
the equilibrium. The Euclidean projection interpretations of the respective 
waterfilling functions are also presented as they are useful in the analysis of 
the properties of the eqUilibrium 
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3.4 Iterative waterfilling for frequency-selective GICs 
3.4.1 System model 
Consider a Gausslan frequency-selective interference channel with N fre-
quencles, composed of Q SISO links The quantity Hqr(k) denotes the fre-
quency response for the kth frequency bm of the channel between source r 
and destmation q. The variance of the zero-mean circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian noise at receiver q over the frequency bin k is denoted by (]~(k) 
The channel is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duration of the trans-
miSSIOn. Each receiver is assumed to know the channel between itself and the 
corresponding transmitter, but not other transmitters Also, each receiver 
is assumed to be able to measure, with no errors, the overall power spectral 
density of the nOise plus multi-user mterference generated by other users 
Based on thIS mformatlOn, each receiver computes the optimal power allo-
cation across the frequency bins for its own link and transmits It back to the 
correspondmg transmitter through a low bit-rate error-free feedback chan-
nel. Let the vector Sq ~ [sq(l)sq(2) ... sq(N)] be the N symbols transmitted 
by user q on the N frequency bins and pq(k) ~ E{lsq(k)12} be the power 
allocated to the kth frequency bin by user q and Pq ~ [pq(l)pq(2) ... pq(N)] 
be the power allocation vector. The maximum achievable mformatlOn rate 
by user q is gIVen by [64] 
1 N 
Rq = N L 10g(1 + sinrq(k)), 
k=! 
(3.4 1) 
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where simq(k) is the slgnal-to-lOterference plus noise ratio (SINR) on the 
kth frequency bin of the qth user, 
(3.4.2) 
3.4.2 Rate-maximization game 
The problem of power allocation across the frequency blOs is cast as strategic 
noncooperative game with the SISO links as players and their informatIOn 
rates as pay-off functions, under the following two constraints. 
• Maximum total transmit power for each user: 
N 
E {lIsqlln = Lpq(k):$ NPq, q= 1, ... ,Q, (343) 
k=! 
where Pq is power in units of energy per transmitted symbol. 
• Spectral mask constraints. 
(3.4.4) 
for k = 1, ... ,N and q = 1, . . ,Q, where p~(k) is the maximum 
power that is allowed to be allocated by user q for the frequency blO 
k 
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Mathematically, the game can be written as 
max 
pq 
1 N NE log(l + sinrq(k)) 
k=I 
s.t. Pq E 'Pq 
51 
liq En (3.4.5) 
where n ~ {I, .. , Q} is the set of the Q players (Le. the SISO links) and 
'Pq IS the set of admissIble strategies of user q, which is defined as 
{
IN 
'Pq ~ Pq E]RN : N Epq(k) = 1, 0:5 pq(k) :5 p;='(k), k = 1, . 
k=I 
,N}. 
(3.4.6) 
The inequahty constraint in (4.2.1) IS replaced wIth the equahty constraint 
as, at the optimum of each problem in (3 4 5), the constramt must be satisfied 
wIth equality. To avoid the trIvIal solution pq(k) = p;;"'X(k) lik, it IS assumed 
that E~I p,;,ax > N Further, the players can be hlllited to pure strategies 
instead of mixed strategies, as shown in [91 J. 
3.4.3 Nash equilibrium 
The solutIon to the game <,gs is the Nash eqUIlIbrium. At any Nash eqUIlib-
rium of thIS game, the optimum action profile of the players {p~}qEn must 
satisfy the following set of nonhnear equatIons 
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The waterfilling operator WF~(-) is defined as [93J 
k = 1, .. . ,N 
(3.4.8) 
where J.t~ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint k 2:£1=1 P; = l.The En-
clidean projection [xJ~ is defined as 
a Ifx:5a 
[xJ~ = x If a < x < b (3.4.9) 
WaterfilJing as a projection 
The waterfillmg function WF~ (.) can be equivalently represented as a Eu-
clidean projection This is the key concept that allows the analytical study 
of convergence of the Iterative waterfilling-based algonthms 
THEOREM 3 3 The waterfilltn9 opemtlOn WF~(-) w (3.4.8) can be equwa-
lently wntten as [92/ 
(3.4 10) 
where 
[• ( )J 1>. C7~(k) + 2:r#q IHqr(kJl2Pr(k) Isnrq P-q k - I Hqq(k)12 (34.11) 
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Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium 
Let v':;"n <:;; {1, ... , N} denote the set of frequency bins {1,.. ,N} from 
which the frequency bins that user q would never use as the best response 
set to any strategIes adopted by the other users are removed [91] 
v;"n ~ {k E {I, .. ,N}: 3 P_q E 'P_q such that [WF~(p-q)h f o} 
(34.12) 
where 'P_q ~ PI X ••• X Pq-I X 'Pq+1 X ••• x PQ Given the game <,#S, the 
non-negatIve matrix smax E IR~xQ is defined as 
if r oF q, 
(34.13) 
otherwise 
The sufficient condItIon for existence and uniqueness of the N ash eqUlhbrium 
of game <,#S IS given by the followmg theorem [91]: 
THEOREM 34. Game <,#S has at least one Nash equlMrlUm for any set of 
channel matnces and tmnsmlt powers of the users. Furthermore, the Nash 
eqmMrium IS unique If 
(3.4.14) 
where smax IS defined In (3413). 
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3.4.4 Asynchronous iterative wateriilling algorithm 
Let the discrete set 'll' !; N+ = 1,2, ... be the set of times at which one 
or more users update their strategIes. Let p~n) denote the vector power 
allocation of user q at the dIscrete time n, and let 'll' q !; 'll' represent the set 
of tIme instants n when the power vector p~n) of user q is updated Let 7'7{ n) 
denote the time when the most recently perceIved interference from user r 
was computed by user q at tIme n (Note that 0 :0; 7'7 (n) :0; n) Hence, If user 
q updates Ius strategy at tIme n, then 
(34 15) 
The asynchronous IteratIve waterfilhng algorIthm (AIWFA) for comput-
ing the Nash eqUIlIbrium of game 'ifs in a dIStrIbuted fashion is descnbed in 
Algorithm 3 1. The convergence of AlgOrIthm 3.1 IS guaranteed under the 
following sufficiency condItIon [93[. 
THEOREM 3 5. The asynchronous tterntlVe waterfilltng algonthm descnbed 
tn Algonthm 3.1 converges to the umque Nash equthbnum of game 'ifS as 
T -+ 00 for any set of feastble tmttal condttwns tf condttlon (3.4.14) tS 
satlsfied 
The global convergence of the asynchronous iterative waterfilling algo-
rithm to the unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed by Theorem 35 usmg 
condItion (3.4.13) despite game 'ifs and the waterfilling operation WF~O 
bemg nonlinear. 
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Algorithm 3.1 - Asynchronous IteratIve Waterfilhng Algorithm 
Input: 
n Set of users in the system 
Pq ' Set of admIssIble strategies of user q 
'Iq: Set of tIme instants n when the power vector p~n) of user q is 
updated 
T Number of Iterations for which the algorithm is run 
r7(n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r avaIlable 
to user q at time n 
WF~ (-): Waterfilling operatIOn In (3 4 8) 
Initialization: n = 0 and p~O) <- any p E Pq , 'Iq E n 
forn=OtoTdo 
p~n+I) = q P-q , 
{ 
WFs ( (T'(nn) 
P(n) q , 
end for 
ifn E 'Iq, 
otherwise, 
3.5 Iterative waterfilling for MIMO GICs 
3.5.1 System model 
'1qE n. 
Consider a narrowband MIMO Gaussian interference channel composed of 
Q MIMO Imks. The SIgnal vector Yq E enR,xl measured at the receiver of 
user q is 
Yq = Hqqxq + L Hrqx,. + nq 
r#q 
(3.5.1) 
where Hrq E enR, xnTr IS the channel matrix between source r and des-
tinatIOn q, Xq E enT, xl is the signal vector transnutted by source q and 
nq E enR,XI is the receiver noise vector of user q, whIch is assumed to be a 
zero-mean CIrcularly symmetrIc complex Gausslan vector WIth an arbitrary 
(nonsingular) covariance matrix Rn,. The second term in the rIght hand 
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side of (3.5.1) is the multi-user interference observed at the destination q, 
which is treated as additive spatIally coloured Gaussian noise at the receiver 
of user q. The channel is assumed to be quasI-stationary for the duratIOn 
of the transmission. At each receIver q, the channel matrIX Hqq is assumed 
to be known. Also, each receiver is assumed to be able to measure the co-
variance matrix of the nOIse plus multi-user mterference generated by other 
users Based on this information, each destination q computes the optimal 
covarlance matrices Qq ~ E{ XqXq H} for Its own link and transmits It back to 
Its transmitter through a low bIt-rate error-free feedback channel. This gIves 
the optimal transmitter beamformer for each of the users The information 
rate of user q, Rq(Qq, Q_q), for this system can be wrItten as [63] 
(352) 
where 
R-q(Q_q) ~ Rn, + LHrqQrH~ (353) 
rlq 
is the mterference plus nOIse covariance matrix observed by destination q, 
and Q_q ~ {Qr} ~",q is the set of covarlance matrices of all users except the 
qth user 
3.5.2 Rate-maximization game 
Consider the system in (3.5.1) as a strategIc noncooperative game with the 
MIMO links as players and information rates of the respective links as payoff 
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functions Each player q competes ratIOnally agamst other users in order to 
ma.x!mlze Its own mformation rate Rq(Qq, Q_q) by designmg the optimal 
covariance matrix Q;, given the constramt 
(3 5.4) 
where Pq is the ma.x!mum average power transmitted m units of energy per 
transmissIOn Mathematically, the game can be written as 
(3 5 5) 
s. t. Qq E !!Iq 
where n ~ {1, ... , Q} is the set of the Qplayers (Le. MIMO links), Rq(Qq, Q_q) 
is the payoff function of player q as given m (3 5 2) and the set of admiSSible 
strategies of player q, !!Iq, is defined as 
(3.5.6) 
The mequallty constramt in (3 5.4) is replaced with the equality constraint 
as, at the optimum of each problem in (3.5 5), the constraint must be satisfied 
With equality [99] Further, it can be proved that the players can be limited 
to pure strategies instead of mixed strategies, as shown in [91]. 
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3.5.3 Nash equilibrium 
The solutIOn to the game <;§M is the Nash equilibrIum. Given Q_q E 2l_q ~ 
221 X ••• X 2lq- 1 X 22q+1 x .. 2lQ at any Nash eqUilibrIUm of this game, the 
optimum action profile of the players {Q;} qEO must satisfy 
The waterfilling operator WF);' ( ) is defined as [99] 
(358) 
where /-Igt is chosen to satisfy Tr ((/-IgtI - Dql )+) = Pq • The (semi)-umtary 
matrix of eigenvectors Uq = Uq(Q_q) E enT• xr• and the diagonal matrix 
Dq = Dq(Q_q) E IR,:r' with Tq ~ rank(H~R:!(Q_q)Hqq) = rank(Hqq) 
positive eigenvalues are calculated from the elgendecomposition 
(3.5.9) 
Waterfilling operation as a projection 
The waterfilling operatIOn WF);'( ) can be interpreted as a matrix projection 
onto a convex set [92] The projectIOn expressIOn depends on the nature of 
the channel matrices Hqq , Le. whether it is square and nonsingular or not. 
THEOREM 36. For the system in (351) unth an arb,tmry (poss,bly singu-
lar) set of channel matrzces, the MIMO water filling opemtor WF);'(Q_q) In 
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(3 5 8) can be equzvalently wrttten as [gg} 
(3.5.10) 
The projection operator P N(A) is defined as 
(3511) 
where NA IS any matrix whose columns span the null space of A gIven by 
N(A). 
COROLLARY 3 6 1. If the dtrect channel matrtces Hqq are square and non-
smgular for every user q, then the MIMO waterfillmg operator WF~(Q_q) 
m (358) can be equzvalently wntten as [63} 
(35.12) 
In this case, Uq becomes a umtary matrix and Dq WIll be of dImenSIOn 
nrq x nr. with nTq elgenvalues as the matrix Hqq will be a full-column rank 
matrix with rq = rank(Hqq) = nrq• It can easIly be verified that the result 
in (3 5.12) is a special case of (3.5.10), as P N(Hqq) = 0 when the channel 
matrices Hqq are square and nonsingular, and thus full column-rank. 
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Existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium 
Given the MIMO system in (3.5.1), the non-negative matrices S E lR~xQ 
and sup E lR~xQ are defined as 
if r # q, 
(3513) 
otherwIse 
and 
if r # q, 
(3.5.14) 
otherwise, 
where innrq is the interference-plus-noise to noise ratIO and is defined as [99] 
~ 1, "Iq E n. (35.15) 
GIven sup and S, the matrix S"P E lR~xQ is defined as 
if rank(Hqq) = nRq, 
(3.5.16) 
otherwise, 
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium of game r,gM is given by the following theorem [99]. 
THEOREM 3.7. Game r,gM has at least one Nash equ,lIbnum for any set of 
channel matnces and transm,t powers of the users. FUrthermore, the Nash 
Section 35 Iterative waterfillmg for MIMO GICs 61 
equ,lIbnum ,s unzque 'f 
(3.5.17) 
where S"P ,s defined ,n (3.5.16) 
COROLLARY 3 7.1. If the dZ1'ect channel matnces Hqq are square and non-
szngular for every user q, then the sufficient cond,/zon for the unzqueness of 
the Nash equ,/zbnum of game '§M ,s [63J 
peS) < 1 (35.18) 
where S ,s defined as 
[S]qr ~ f l 0, 'fr I- q, (3.5.19) otherwzse. 
3.5.4 MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm 
Let the discrete set 'll' ~ 1'>1+ = 1,2, .. be the set of times at wluch one or 
more users update their strategies. Let Q~ n) denote the covariance matrix 
of user q at the discrete time n, and let 11' q ~ 11' denote the set of time 
Instants n when the covanance matrix Q~n) of user q is updated Let r7(n) 
denote the time when the most recently perceived interference from user r 
was computed by user q at time n (Note that 0 :5 r7(n) :5 n). Hence, If user 
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Algorithm 3.2 - MIMO IteratIve Waterfilling Algonthm 
Input: 
n: Set of users III the system 
§q: Set of admissible strategies of user q 
1'q' Set of time instants n when the covanance matrix Q~n) of user q 
is updated 
T: Number of iterations for which the algonthm is run 
r7{n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r available 
to user q at time n 
WF~(-)' Waterfilllllg operation III (35 8) 
Initialization: n = 0 and Q~O) <- any Q E §q, "Iq E n 
forn=OtoT do 
{ 
WFM (Q(Tq(n))) 
Q~n+l) = q -q , 
Q (n) q , 
if{n) E 1'q, 
VqEn, 
otherWise 
end for 
q updates his strategy at time n, then 
The MlMO iterative waterfilling algonthm (MIWFA) for computing the 
Nash equihbrium of game r,gM in a dlstnbuted fashion is descnbed in Al-
gorithm 3 2. The convergence of Algonthm 3 2 is guaranteed under the 
following sufficiency conditIOn [99]' 
THEOREM 3.8. The MIMO Iteratwe waterfilhng algortthm, descrtbed In Al-
gortthm 3.2 converges to the unique Nash eqUll!brtum of game r,gM as T --> 00 
for any set of feasible Initial conditIOns If condition (3.5.17) IS satisfied. 
The global convergence of the MIMO iterative waterillling algorithm to 
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the uuique Nash eqUlhbnum IS guaranteed by Theorem 3.8 using condItion 
(35.17) despIte game r#M and the waterfilling operatIOn WF!tO being non-
linear and is vahd for arbitrary channel matrices, either tall/fat or singular. 
3.6 Iterative waterfilling for broadband MIMO GICs 
The previous section introduced the MIMO Iterative waterfilling algonthm 
for narrowband systems. Here, thIS framework is extended to broadband 
(OFDM) systems, hmlted to systems wIth square (nonsmgular) direct chan-
nel matrices The challenge in such a scenario is that the power allocation 
has to be performed across both frequency and space (VIZ. transmit an-
tennas) This IS achieved by modIfying the constraints in the waterfilling 
expression so that power allocation is optimal in both space and frequency. 
The spatial optimality IS essentially desigumg the optimal beamformer and 
the spectral optimallty is the magmtude of power spectral densIty at each 
frequency bin. 
3.6.1 System model 
Consider a broadband MIMO Gaussian interference channel with N fre-
quencles composed of Q MIM 0 hnks. At any frequency f, the sigual vector 
ye E cnRq x 1 measured at the receiver of user q is 
I-HI I+"HI 1+ I Y q - qqXq L., rqXT nq , (36.1) 
r#q 
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where Htq E e nR, xnTr is the channel matrIX between source r and destina-
tion q, x& E enT,xl is the vector transmitted by source q and n& E enR,XI 
is the receiver noise of user q, which is a zero-mean circularly symmetric 
complex Gaussian vector with an arbitrary (nonsingular) covarlance matrix 
R~ •. The second term in the right hand side of (3 61) is the multi-user inter-
ference observed at the destinatlOu q, which is treated as additive spatially 
coloured nOise. The channel is assumed to be stationary for the duration of 
the transmission. At each receiver q, the channel matrix H&q IS assumed to 
be known Note that there are no constraints on the dimensions or rank of 
the channel matrices. Also, each receiver IS assumed to be able to measure 
the covariance matrix of the noise plus multi-user interference generated by 
other users. The covariance matrix of the noise plus multi-user interference 
observed by destmatlOn q at frequency f is given by 
R I ~ nl "'HI Q/HI H 
-q - .L"'nq + ~ rq r rq . 
rh 
(3.6.2) 
Based on this information, each destination q computes the optimal covari-
ance matrices Q& ~ E{x&x&H} for each frequency f for Its own link and 
mforms ItS tranSInltter through a low bit-rate error-free feedback channel. 
Let Qq and ft... be the set of the transmitter covarlance matrices and 
noise covariance of player q for the N frequency bins written in block-
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diagonal form respectively, 
o 
(36.3) 
o 
and 
o 
-- fl. 1 N Rn. = Dlag (R;,., ... , ~.) = (364) 
o 
The channel matrices and the nOise plus multi-user interference covariance 
matrices can be written in block-diagonal form respectively as 
o 
~ ". 1 N) Hrq = Dlag (Hrq , ... , Hrq = (365) 
o H~ 
and 
o 
(366) 
o 
The information rate achieved by user q over all frequency bms IS given by 
(3.6.7) 
Each player q competes rationally agamst other users in order to maxmuze 
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Its own mformatIOn rate Rq(Qq, Q_q) by designing the optimal covanance 
matrIX Q~, gIven the constraint 
N N 
E {L IIxtll~} = L Th(Qtl = Th(Qq) $ Pq , 
/=1 /=1 
(368) 
where Pq is the maxnnum average power transmItted in units of energy per 
transmission. 
3.6.2 Rate-maximization game 
The game can be cast in mathematical form as 
max Rq(Qq,Q_q) Q. 
s t Qq E 9;, 
'VqE n, (3 6.9) 
where n ~ {I, ... , Q} is the set ofthe Q players (i e. MIMO links), Rq(Qq, Q_q) 
is the payoff function of player q as gIven in (3.6.7) and the set of admiSSIble 
strategIes of player q, 9;, is defined as 
N 
9; ~ {Q : L Th(Qt) = Pq ; Qt E enT• xnT., 
/=1 (36.10) 
ThIS game can now be solved usmg the MIMO iterative waterfillmg algorithm 
[99] as the new matrices Qq, R_q and iIrq satisfy the necessary condItIons 
and assumptions. 
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Tx 1 
Tx2 
Tx3 
Figure 3.2: System with 3 MIMO links and 4 frequencies. ()qr is the 
electrical angle of the signal observed at destination r from source q. 
3.6 .3 Numerical results 
To confirm the operation of the algorithm in a broad band setup, a broad-
band system having 3 MIMO links and 4 frequencies is considered. In order 
to show the coherence of the beamformer direction across frequencies, the 
signal received at destination ,. from source q is assumed to be at an elec-
trical angle 9qr + E, where E is a small Gaussian random variable that varies 
across different frequencies. The sources have 6, 5 and 3 antennas and their 
corresponding destinations have 4, 7 and 4 antennas respectively placed as a 
uniform linear array as shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3a shows the informa-
tion rate achieved by each user against iteration index for the system shown 
in Figure 3.2, with 9ll = 57f / 6,912 = 7f / 6, 913 = 7f /4, 921 = -7f /6, 922 = 
71r / 6,923 = - 7f/4, 931 = 2rr/3, 932 = 57f/6 and 933 = 7f/3. As seen in the 
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figure, t he broad band MIMO waterfi lling algorithm has very fast conver-
gence as expected from [99] . The information rates of the users reach their 
equilibrium values with 2-3 iterations. 
Figure 3.3b shows the plot of the beamforming patterns associated with 
the dominant eigenvalues of the optimal covariance matrices computed using 
the broad band MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm for the above setup. 
The major lobes are in the direction of the appropriate receiver at all fre-
quencies for both users. There are no side lobes as the system considered 
does not have multi path propagation. The fast convergence and appropriate 
beamformer directions have been observed for many channel realizations and 
different number of users and frequencies. 
3.7 Effect of CSI estimation errors 
In this section , the effect of errors in the CSI on the Nash equilibrium of the 
MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm is investigated. T he MIMO iterative 
waterfilling algorithm [99] assumes t hat the direct channel matrices Hqq can 
be estimated accurately, which is not possible in practical systems. The 
estimate of the direct channel matrices in the presence of errors, H qq , can 
be written as 
(3.7.1) 
where N q is a nn. x nT. matrix with zero mean complex Gaussian random 
elements of variance (72. The optimal covariance matrices {Q~} qEfl are com-
puted based on the channel matrices H qq using the waterfilling algorithm 
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Figure 3.3: System with two links with 4 antennas each and 011 
57r/6, 012 = 7r/6,013 = 7r/4, 021 = -1[/6,022 = 77r/6,023 = -7r/4,031 -
27r /3,032 = 57r / 6 and 033 = 7r / 3. 
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Figure 3.4: Histograms of total information rates achieved using the 
MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm (a) in the absence of CSI esti-
mation errors and (b) in the presence of CSI estimation errors. It can 
be seen t hat t he information rate achieved by the algorithm is reduced 
in the presence of CSI estimation errors. 
and the total information rate achieved by all users with these covariance 
matrices is compared with the total information rates that would have been 
achieved in the absence of CSI estimation errors. 
Consider a two user case, each with 4 receive and 4 transmit antennas. 
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The elements of the channel matrices Hqr are complex Gaussian random 
variables of unit variance and a = 0 5 This setup is run for 100,000 dif-
ferent channel realizations. The histograms of the total mformation rates 
achieved in the absence and presence of CSI estimation errors are presented 
in Figures 3.4a and 3.4b respectively It is clear that CSI estimation errors 
have a siguificant effect on the performance of the MIMO iterative water-
filling algorithm. The average loss in performance IS about 7.45%. This 
indicates the necessity for the study of the robust distributed algorithms for 
optimal power allocation in the presence of CSI errors 
3.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the conceptual and mathematical foundatIOns from different 
areas needed for the techmques proposed m this thesis were summarized. 
This mcluded results from contractIOn and fixed pomt theory, mformatlOn 
theory (Gausslan channels and waterfilling) and the main game-theoretic ap-
proach to competitive rate-maxJmlzation in Gaussian interference channels. 
A brief investigation into the effect of channel state mformation errors on 
the performance of the MIMO iterative waterfillmg algorithm was also pre-
sented, setting the scene for the robust solutions proposed in the subsequent 
chapters 
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Appendix 3.A KKT Conditions 
A convex optimization problem can be defined in the standard form as 
nun fo{x) 
x 
s. t. f.{x)::; 0, i= 1, ... ,m, (3.A.l) 
h.{x) = 0, t= 1, .. ,p, 
where the vector x E Rn IS the optzmzzatwn variable of the problem, the 
functions fo,' .. ,fm are convex functions and the functIOns hI.' .. ,hp are 
hnear functions. The function fo is the obJectwe functwn or cost functwn. 
The inequahties f,{x) ::; 0 are called the mequabty constmmts and equahties 
h, (x) = 0 are called the equalzty constmmts. If there are no constraints, 
then the problem IS srud to be an unconstrruned problem. The domam of 
the optimization problem (3.A.l) is the set of points for which the objective 
and the constraints are defined and IS denoted as 
m p 
D = n domf, n n domh, (3.A.2) 
,=0 ,=0 
A pomt x E D is feasible, if it satisfies all the constrrunts f.{x) ::; 0 z = 
1,··· ,m and h.{x) = 0 i = 1,··· ,p. Problem (3 A.l) is srud to be feaszble 
If at least one feasible point exists and IS mfeaszble otherwise. The ophmal 
value or the solutwn of the optimization problem is achieved at the optimal 
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pomt x* If and only if 
fo(x*) $ fo(x) 'Ix E D. (3.A 3) 
The Lagrangwn L:]Rn x]Rmx]RP ..... ]R for the original problem in (3.A.l) 
can be defined as [51] 
m p 
L(x,~,v) = fo(x) + LA.!.(x) + Lv.h.(x), (3.A 4) 
t=1 t=1 
where A. and v. are the Lagrange multtpliers associated with the tth inequal-
Ity constraint f.(x) $ 0 and equality constraint h.(x) = 0 respectively The 
objective fo(x) in (3.A 1) is called the prtmal obJectwe and the optimiza-
tion variable x IS termed the prtmal vartable. Lagrange multipliers ~ and v 
associated with the problem (3 A.4) are called the dual vartables 
The Karush-Kuhn-Thcker conditions (also known as the Kuhn-Thcker 
or KKT conditions) are given by [51]. 
1. Primal feasibility: 
2. Dual feasibihty: 
f.(x) $ 0 
h.(x) = 0 
i = 1,2, ... ,m, 
t=I,2,oo.,p. 
t=1,2, .. ,m 
(3 A 5) 
(3.A.6) 
(3 A 7) 
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3. Complementary slackness: 
>',f,(x) = 0 z=1,2, .. ,m. (3 A 8) 
4 Stationarity: 
m p 
'Yfo(x) + L>.,'Yf,(x) + Lv,'Yh,(x) = 0 (3.A.9) 
t=l t=l 
The KKT conditions are necessary conditions for optimaiity III general but 
not sufficient conditions 
Chapter 4 
ROBUST IWFA FOR SISO 
FREQUENCY-SELECTIVE 
SYSTEMS 
In the previous chapter, the rate-maximization games for frequency-selective 
and MIMO Gausslan interference channels were mtroduced and the adverse 
effect of uncertamty in channel state information on the performance of 
these games was demonstrated. The results therein mdlcate that there is a 
necessity for the development of robust rate-maxiIruzation games that can 
perform well under channel state mformatJon uncertainty. In tWs chapter, an 
analytical framework for the robust rate-maximization game for a frequency-
selective Gaussian mterference channel is developed and characterized. 
The chapter begins with a discussIOn of other work m the literature which 
has addressed the channel uncertainty issue ill rate-maxnnization games. 
This is followed by the illtroduction of a distributIOn-free robust frame-
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work for rate-maximization games under bounded channel uncertaInty. The 
closed-form eqUlhbrium solution of this game is then derived, followed by 
analytical proofs for eXIstence and uniqueness of the equihbnum. An asyn-
chronous Iterative algorithm to compute the eqUlhbrlUm is then proposed. 
Finally, simulatIOn results to demonstrate the behaviour of the algorithm 
are presented. 
4.1 Related work 
Uncertainty in game-theoretic and mstnbuted-optnnization problems in wire-
less communications has only recently been investigated. The Issue of bounded 
uncertainty In specIfic distrIbuted optimization problems in communication 
networks has been investigated In [101] whereIn techmques to define the 
uncertainty set such that they can be solved distrIbutIvely by robust opti-
mization techniques are presented 
A robust optimization approach for the rate-maXImlzation game WIth 
uncertainty in the noise-plus-interference estImate has been bnefly Investi-
gated In [102], where the authors present a numerically computed algonthm 
unhke the closed form results presented in thIS chapter. Such a numerIcal 
solution prevents further mathematical analysis of the eqUlhbrlUm and its 
behaviour under different uncertainty bounds. Also, this uncertainty model 
IS dIfferent from the one adopted in this work, where the availability of CS! 
of the interferIng channels with bounded uncertainty IS assumed 
A SImIlar problem ofrate-maximizatlOn in the presence of uncertainty in 
Section 4 1 Related work 77 
the estimate of noise-plus-interference levels due to quantlzation in the feed-
back channel has been consIdered in [103]. ThIS problem has been solved 
using a probablhstically constraIned optimization approach and as in the 
work presented In thIS chapter, also results in the waterfilhng solution mov-
ing closer to an FDMA solution, with corresponding improvement in sum-
rate However, the effect of quantization on the conditions for exIstence and 
uniqueness of the equilIbrium and convergence of the algorIthm have not 
been considered The results presented In [103] are for a sequentially up-
dated algorIthm whereas the results ofthis chapter allow asynchronous (and 
thus sequential or simultaneous) updates to the algorithm Also, the power 
allocations computed by such a probabIiistic optimizatIOn formulation do 
not guarantee that the Infonnation rates expected will be achIeved for all 
channel realIzations, unlIke the worst-case optmuzatlOn formulatIon in thIS 
chapter. Furthermore, the relative error (and not just the absolute error due 
to quantizatlOn) in the interference estimate as defined in [103] is assumed to 
be bounded and drawn from a uniform distribution, which is inaccurate. In 
adchtlOn, this bound on the relative error can only be computed If the noise 
variance at the receivers IS assumed to be known (which is not the case) The 
bounds computed In such a fashIOn are very loose and will degrade system 
performance. The other assumptIOn that this relative error bound is in the 
range [0, 1) means that the absolute quantization error has to be less than 
the noise varIance at the receIvers, whIch restricts the apphcability of the 
approach The problem formulation In this chapter has no such limitation 
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on the uncertainty bound based on the nOIse varIances in the system. 
Dynamic robust games for MIMO systems, where a learnmg framework 
is used to develop suitable power allocations m repeated games WIth chan-
nel uncertaInty and delayed imperfect payoffs (mformation rate), have been 
recently proposed m [104]. A robust rate-maxmuzatIOn game for a cogni-
t,ve radio scenario WIth uncertaInty in the channel to the primary user has 
been presented in [105]. This leads to a noncooperative game formulation 
WIthout any uncertaintIes in the payoff functions of the game (unlIke the 
game formulatIOn in this chapter) with robust interference lmllts actmg as 
a constraInt on the admissible set of strategies. Th,s game is then solved 
using numerical techniques as there is no closed form solutIOn. 
4.2 System model 
Consider a system SImilar to the one m [93], whIch IS a SISO frequency-
selective Gaussian interference channel WIth N frequencIes, composed of 
Q SISO links n £ {I, ... , Q} is the set of the Q players (Le. SISO 
links). The quantIty Hrq{k) denotes the complex frequency response of 
the k-th frequency bm of the channel between source r and destination 
q. The varIance of the zero-mean CIrcularly symmetric complex Gaussian 
noise at receIver q in the frequency bin k is denoted by i7~{k) The chan-
nel IS assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duration of the transmission 
Let O'~{k) £ i7~{k)/IHqq{k)12 and the total transmit power of user q be Pq. 
Let the vector Sq £ [sq{l) sq(2) ... sq{N)] be the N symbols transmItted 
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by user q on the N frequency bIns and pq{k) £ E{lsq{kW} be the power 
allocated to the k-th frequency bIn by user q and Pq £ [pq{l) pq(2) . . pq{N)J 
be the power allocation vector. The power allocation of each user q has two 
constraInts. 
• Maximum total transffilt power for each user 
N 
E {llsqllD = 2:pq{k) ~ Pq, (4.2.1) 
k=1 
for q = 1, ... , Q, where Pq is power in units of energy per transmitted 
symbol. 
• Spectral mask constraints 
(4 2 2) 
for k = 1, ... ,N and q = 1, ... ,Q, where p;;'={k) is the maximum 
power that IS allowed to be allocated by user q for the frequency bin 
k. 
Each receiver estimates the channel between itself and all the transmit-
ters, which is private information. The power allocation vectors are public 
informatIOn, I e known to all users. Each receiver computes the optimal 
power allocation across the frequency bins for its own link and transmits it 
back to the correspondIng transmitter in a low bit-rate error-free feedback 
channel. Note that this leads to sharing of more Information compared to 
other work in the literature such as [93J. The channel state InformatIOn 
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estimated by each receiver is assumed to have a bounded uncertainty of un-
known dIstribution An ellipsoid is often used to apprOXilllate complicated 
convex uncertaInty sets [51]. The ellIpsoidal approximation has the advan-
tage of parametrically modelling complicated data sets and thus provides a 
convement Input parameter to algorithms. Further, in certain cases there 
are statistical reasons leading to ellipsoidal uncertaInty sets and also results 
In optimization problems with convenient analytical structures [60,106]. 
At each frequency, the uncertainty In the channel state information of 
each user IS deterministically modelled under an ellIpSOIdal approximationi 
:Fq = {Frq(k) + ~Frq,k : L I~Frq,kI2 :,; €~ '1k = 1, . ,N}, (4.2.3) 
r#q 
where €q ;::: 0 'I q E n is the uncertaInty bound and 
(4.24) 
with Frq(k) being the nominal value It IS possible to consider uncertainty 
in Frq(k) Instead of Hrq(k) because bounded uncertaIntIes in Frq(k) and 
Hrq(k) are eqmvalent, but with different bounds.2 
1 More specIfically, the uncertainty set in (4.2 3) IS a spherical approximation. 
'The model considered here has some redundancy in the uncertaInty for the case 
when Frq(k) = 0 which leads to mcIudmg Frq(k) + ~Frq,k < 0 in the model which 
can never happen m practice. However, this does not affect the solution in this 
method due to the nature of the max-mm problem formulatIOn in (4.3 3) which 
leads to selectIon of positIve values of ~Frq,k 
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The nonunal mformation rate of user q can be wrItten as [64J 
(4.25) 
A robust rate-maxImIzation game IS formulated and analyzed based on 
tills system model in the subsequent sections of this chapter and in Chapter 5. 
4.3 Robust rate-maximization game formulation 
According to the robust game model presented in Section 2.5 on page 30, 
each player formulates a best response as the solution of a robust (worst-case) 
optimizatIOn problem for the uncertamty In the payoff functIon (information 
rate), gIven the other players' strategIes. If all the players know that everyone 
else IS usmg the robust optimizatIOn approach to the payoff uncertainty, they 
would then be able to mutually predIct each other's behaviour. The robust 
game !1'~b where each player q formulates a worst-case robust optimization 
problem can be written as, 'r/ q E n, 
N ( p (k) ) max mm Llog 1+ q _ 
pq FrqE:Fq k=1 a~(k) + L: Frq(k)Pr(k) 
rtq (4.31) 
s. t. Pq E Pq , 
where :Fq IS the uncertainty set which is modelled under ellipsoid approxi-
matIOn as shown m (4.2.3), n ~ {I, ... , Q} is the set of the Q players {Le. 
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the SISO hnks) and Pq is the set of admissIble strategIes of user q, which IS 
defined as 
N 
Pq g, {pq E RN : Lpq{k) = Pq, 0::; pq{k) ::; p~{k), k = 1, ... ,N}. 
k=1 
(43.2) 
This optinnzation problem USIng uncertainty sets can be equivalently written 
in a form represented by protection functIOns [101] as, 'Iq E n, 
max min t log (1 + Pq{k) ) 
P. !IF,.,k k=l (T~{k) + ~ (Frq{k) + llFrq,k)Pr{k) 
r.,-q 
s. t. L IllFrq,kl2 ::; f~, k = 1, N 
r#q 
USIng the Cauchy-Schwarz inequalIty [107], '1k = 1, .. ,N, 
1 
L llFrq,kPr{k) ::; [L IllFrq,kl2 L IPr{k)1 2]" 
r#q r#q r#q 
::; fqVEr#qr..{k) 
USIng (4 3 5), the robust game can be formulated as, 'Iq E n, 
max t log (1 + pq{k) 
P. k=l (T~{k) + E Frq{k)Pr{k) + fq 
rh 
S.t. Pq E Pq• 
(4 3 3) 
(4.3.4) 
(4 3 5) 
(4.36) 
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Having defined the problem for robust rate-maximizatlOn under bounded 
channel uncertainty, the solution to the optirmzation problem In (4 3 6) for 
a single-user is presented in the following section. 
4.4 Robust waterfilling solution 
The closed-form solution to the robust optimization problem in (436) for 
any partIcular user q is given by the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4 1. Gwen the set of power allocatwns of other users P_q ~ 
{PI, ... , Pq-I, Pq+I,· ., PQ}, the solutwn to the robust opltmtzatton problem 
of user q, 
s.t. Pq E Pq. (4.4.1) 
tS gtven by the waterfilltng solutwn 
(4.4.2) 
where the waterfillmg operator RWF~(-) tS defined for k = 1, ... ,N, as 
~ __ p~··(k) [RWF~(p-q)h ~ [/lq - (7~(k) - LFrq(k)Pr(k) - fq Lrr(k)] 
r"#q r"#q 0 
(4.4 3) 
where /l-q ts chosen to sabsfy the power constramt LJ:l=lP~(k) = 1. 
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Proof. See Appendix 4.A. o 
The robust waterfilling operation for each user IS a distributed worst-
case optimization under bounded channel uncertamty Compared with the 
ongmal waterfilling operation m [93] under perfect CSI (i e €q == 0), it can 
be seen that an additional term has appeared in (4 4 3) for €q > O. 
This additional term can be mterpreted as a penalty for allocatmg power 
to frequencies havmg a large product of uncertainty bound and norm of the 
powers of the other players currently transmitting in those frequencies. ThiS 
is because the users assume the worst-case interference from other users and 
are thus conservative about allocating power to such channels where there 
IS a strong presence of other users. 
4.4.1 Robust waterfilling as a projection operation 
Let <l> q (k) represent the denominator terms in (4 4 1), which is the worst-case 
nOlse-plus-mterference 
<l>q{k) ~ a~{k) + LFrq{k)Pr{k) + €q LP~{k). ( 4.4.4) 
r#q r#q 
It has been shown in [92] that the waterfilhng operation can be mterpreted as 
the Euc1idean projection of a vector onto a Simplex. Using this framework, 
the robust waterfilling operator in (4 4 3) can be expressed as the Euc1idean 
projection of the vector Tq ~ [<l>q(l), ., <l>q(N)JT onto the Simplex Pq de-
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fined in (432): 
which can be conveniently written as 
where 
U q ~ H(l),oo.,O'~(NJt, 
Frq ~ Diag (Frq(l), oo.,Frq(N)), 
fq ~ [JL;o'qP~(l), ... , './'L-r;o'-q....,P~,.....(N-f· 
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(445) 
(4.4.6) 
(4.4.7) 
(4.4 8) 
(4.4.9) 
Let N = {I,. ., N} be the set of frequency bins. Let V~ denote the set 
of frequency bins that user q would never use as the best response to any 
set of strategies adopted by the other users, 
(4.4.10) 
where P_q ~ PI X • X Pq-I X Pq+1 x· x PQ. The non-negative matrices 
E and S= E IR~xQ are defined as 
" (fq, [EJqr = 
0, 
ifr;l'q, 
(44.11) 
otherwise, 
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and 
( 
max Frq(k), [S""""jqr g, kE'D,n'Dr 
0, 
if r i q, 
(44.12) 
otherwise, 
where Vq is any subset of {1, ... ,N} such that N - V~ ~ Vq ~ {1, ... , N}. 
Contraction property of the waterfilling projection 
The contraction property of the waterfilling mapping IS given by the following 
lemma: 
LEMMA 4 1. Gwen w g, [Wl, ••• , wQV > 0, the mappmg RWFsO defined 
m (4.B 1) sattsfies 
II RWFs (p(!)) -RWFs (p(2))II;'block ~ IISmax+EII~,mat x IIp(!) -p(2)II;'block' 
(4.4.13) 
IIp(!) ,p(2) E P, E and S as defined m (4 4 11) and (4 4 12) respectwely. 
Furthermore, tf 
IISm." + EII~,mat < 1, (4414) 
for some w > 0, then the mappmg RWFsO tS a block contractwn 1lJ!th 
modulus et = I Ism." + EII~,mat. 
Proof. See Appendix 4 B. o 
Having derived and characterized the robust waterfilhng solution in the 
presence of channel uncertainty, the ISsue of whether a stable equilibrium for 
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the system eXIsts IS to be considered. If so, Its properties and computatIOn 
are to be considered. This is undertaken in the subsequent sections 
4.5 Robust-optimization equilibrium 
The solution to the game ~r~b is the robust-optimization equilibrium. At any 
robust-optimization equilibrium of this game, the optimum action profile of 
the players {p;}qE!l must satisfy the following set of Simultaneous waterfilling 
equations. 'Iq E n, 
(4.5.1) 
It can easily be verified that the robust-optmllzation equilibrIUm reduces 
to the N ash eqUilibrium of the system [93J when there is no uncertainty m 
the system. In Chapter 5, the global efficiency of the robust-optimizatIOn 
eqUilibrium for the two-user case is analyzed and It is shown that the robust-
optimizatIOn eqUilibrIUm has a higher efficiency than the N ash equilibrium 
due to a penalty for mterference which encourages better partitioning of the 
frequency space among the users. 
4.5.1 Analysis of the equilibrium of game ~!b 
The contraction property of the waterfilling mappmg is useful in the analysis 
of the eqUilibrium of game ~~b A sufficient condition for eXIstence and 
uniqueness of the robust-optimizatIOn equilibrium of game ~~b is given by 
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the follow1Og theorem. 
THEOREM 4 2. Game ~r~b has at least one equtllb1"lum for any set of channel 
values and transmtt powers of the users. Furthermore, the equtltb1"lum tS 
unique tf 
p(smax} < 1 - p(E}, (452) 
where E and S are as defined tn (44 11) and (4.412) respectwely. 
Proof See AppendIX 4 C. o 
In the absence of uncerta1Oty, i e when fq = 0 'r/q E n, thiS condition 
reduces to condition (Cl) m [93J as expected. Since p(E} ~ 0, the condition 
on smax becomes more stringent as the uncerta10ty bound increases, i e. the 
set of channel coefficients for which the existence of a umque equihbrium is 
guaranteed shrinks as the uncertainty bound increases. 
4.6 Iterative algorithm for robust waterfilling 
In this section, an iterative waterfillmg algorithm, based on the framework 
presented in Section 3.1.2, for computing the robust-opthmzation eqUlhb-
rium is presented. 
Let the discrete set '][' ~ N+ = {1, 2,.. } be the set of times at which one 
or more users update their strategies and T be the number of iterations for 
which the algonthm is run. Let p~n) denote the vector power allocation of 
user q at the discrete time n, and let '][' q ~ '][' denote the set of time instants 
n when the power vector p~n) of user q IS updated Let r7{n} denote the time 
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Algorithm 4.1 - Robust SISO Iterative Waterfillmg Algorithm 
Input: 
n: Set of users in the system 
Pq: Set of admiSSible strategies of user q 
Tq' Set of time instants n when the power vector p~n) of user q IS 
updated 
T: Number of iterations for which the algorithm is run 
T! (n): Time of the most recent power allocation of user r aVaIlable 
to user q at time n 
RWF~(-): Robust waterfiIIing operation in (4.4.3) 
Initialization: n = 0 and p~O) +- any p E Pq , \Iq E n 
forn=OtoTdo 
{ 
RWFs (p(rq(n))) 
p~n+l) = q -q , 
p~n), otherwise, 
ifn E 'Irq, 
\Iq E n. 
end for 
of the most recent power allocation mformation of user r which is aVaIlable 
to user q at time n (Note that 0 :5 T!{n) :5 n). Hence, If the strategy of user 
q is updated at time n, then 
(46.1) 
The robust asynchronous iterative waterfilling algorIthm for computing 
the eqUIlibrium of game r;'~b in a distrIbuted fashIOn is described in Al-
gOrIthm 4.1. The convergence of AlgOrIthm 4 1 IS guaranteed under the 
followmg sufficiency condition' 
THEOREM 4 3 The asynchronous ttemtlVe waterfilltng algoTtthm descTtbed 
tn AlgoTtthm 4.1 converges to the umque robust-opltmizatton equtltbTtum of 
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game f1r~b as the number of ,teratzons for wh,ch the algonthm ,s run, T --+ 00 
for any set of feas,ble ,mttal cond,twns 'f cond,twn (45 2) ,s sat,sjied. 
Proof. See Appendix 4.D. o 
The global convergence of the distributed robust Iterative waterfillmg 
algorIthm to the unique robust-optimIzation equilibrIum is guaranteed by 
Theorem 4.3 using conditIOn (4.5.2) despIte game f1r~b and the waterfillmg 
operatIOn RWFg(-) being nonlinear. Also, from Lemma 4.1, the modulus of 
the watcrfilhng contraction increases as uncertainty increases ThIs mdicates 
that the convergence of the Iterative waterfilhng algorithm becomes slower 
as the uncertainty increases, as seen m the SImulatIOn results m Section 4.7 
Also, the set of channel coefficients for which convergence of the algorithm 
is guaranteed reduces as the uncertainty bound increases 
COROLLARY 4.3.1. When the unceriamt,es of all the Q users are equal (say 
E), the robust-opbm'zatwn equ,Mnum of game f1r~b ,s umque and Algo-
nthm 4.1 converges to the umque robust-opt'm'zatwn equ.Mnum of game 
~~b as T --+ 00 for any set of feas,ble 'mhal cond,twns 'f 
p(s=) < 1-E(Q-1) (462) 
Proof. When the uncertainties of all Q users is E, p(E) = E(Q - 1). 0 
The above corollary exphcItly shows how the uncertainty bound and the 
number of users in the system affect the existence of the eqUIlibrium and the 
convergence to the equihbrium using an iteratIve waterfilling algOrIthm. For 
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a fixed uncertainty bound, as the number of users m the system increases, 
there IS a larger amount of uncertain mformatlOn in the system. Hence, the 
probabilIty that a given system for a fixed uncertamty bound will converge 
will decrease as the number of users in the system increases. Also, if f{ Q -
1) ~ 1, a umque equilibrium for non-zero uncertainty bounds cannot be 
guaranteed regardless of the channel coefficients ThiS will help determine 
the number of users that could be allowed to operate m the system based 
on the uncertainty bounds. 
The modified waterfillmg operation in (4.4.3) can also be used as a pricing 
mechanism to achieve improved sum-rate performance in a system with no 
uncertainty where f is a design parameter, with all the analytical results 
presented here still bemg valid. 
4.7 Simulation results 
In this section, the behavIOur of the eqUilibrium under varymg uncertainty 
bounds 18 investigated through numerical slmulatlOns The simulations are 
computed for a system with Q users and N frequencies averaged over 5000 
channel realizations The channel gaius are Hrq{k) ~ Ne{O,l) for r i- q 
and Hqq{k) ~ Nc(O, 2 25) The channel uncertamty model used is nominal 
value Frq{k) = Fr~u'{k){l + erq{k)) with erq{k) ~ U{ -;, ;), a < 1. The 
specific parameter values used for the simulatlOns are provided with each 
figure In these slmulations, the actual convergence of the algorithm for 
every channel realization is tested, i e., the simulations are not hmited only 
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Figure 4.5: Average number of channels occupied per user vs. number 
of users, Q. 
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Figure 4.7: Average number of iterations vs. number of users, Q. 
to channels satisfying the convergence condition (4.6.2) . (Refer to Section 5.3 
for simulations which are limited to channels satisfying (4.6.2). It can be seen 
t hat there is li ttle d ifference in t he average behaviour of the equilibrium .) 
Note that the zero uncertainty solution corresponds to the Nash equilib-
rium and the nominal solution is the solution resulting from using the erro-
neous channel values in the traditional rate-maximization game <§s without 
accounting for its uncertainty. The effect of uncertainty, number of users and 
number of frequencies on the average sum-rate of the system, the average 
number of frequencies occupied by each user and the average number of iter-
ations for convergence are examined. In these figures, the Nash equilibrium 
point is when the uncertainty is zero. 
In Figure 4.1, it can be observed that the sum-rate at the Nash equilib-
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num under perfect CS! is less than the sum-rate at the robust-optimization 
eqUilIbrium under Imperfect CS! and that the gap in performance increases 
to about 20% as the uncertainty 0 increases to 0.5 Under imperfect CS!, 
the power allocation using the robust-optimization eqUilIbrIUm in (4 4 3) and 
(45.1) has higher sum-rate as uncertainty mcreases 3 This is because the 
users are more cautious about using frequencies with significant interference, 
thus reducmg the total amount of interference in the system 
In Figure 4 2, It can be observed that the SU1ll-rate of the system under 
the robust solution drops from about 105 nats/transmisslOn to about 80 
nats/transmission when the number of users rises from 2 to 7. This is because 
having a greater number of users results in higher mterference for all users 
and this effect is strong enough to counter user diversity winch would have 
resulted in higher sum-rates if the users were on an FDMA scheme. In 
Figure 4.3, It can be observed that the sum-rate of the system Improves 
with increase m nU1llber of frequencies and also that the robust solution 
contmues to perform better than the nominal solutIOn even when the nU1llber 
of frequencies increases. 
In Figure 4 4, it can be seen that the robust solution results m a lower 
average number of channels per user as the uncertainty, 0 increases. Also, 
the total number of channels each user occupies at the robust-optimizatIOn 
eqUilIbrium is less than at the nominal solutIOn, regardless of the number of 
users, as can be seen in Figure 4.5 This implies that the users are using a 
3(443) and (45 1) are in tenns of absolute uncertamty f while the simulatlOns 
use relative uncertainty d. They are eqUivalent to one another 
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smaller number of frequencies, whIch demonstrates the better partitioning 
of the frequency space among the users to reduce interference Hence, this 
leads to the higher sum-rates as observed in FIgure 4.1. 
In FIgures 4.6 and 4.7, it can be observed that the average number of 
iterations for convergence increases as the uncertaInty 0 and the number 
of users Q increase respectively. ThIS is as expected from Lemma 4.1 and 
Corollary 4.3 1, as the modulus of the block-contractIOn in (4.4.13) Increases 
as the uncertainty increases. Tills Indicates that the step size of each Itera-
tion reduces as uncertainty increases, leading to slower convergence Thus, 
the trade-off for robust solutIOns with higher sum-rates is in a Wgher number 
of iterations before convergence. 
4.8 Summary 
In this chapter, a robust framework for rate-maximization games under 
bounded channel uncertainty was developed. After definIng the robust rate-
maxImlzation game, closed-form expressions for the eqUIlIbrium solutIOn 
were derived. An asynchronous iteratIve waterfilling algorithm for comput-
ing the eqUIlIbrium was proposed. Sufficient condItions for the existence and 
uniqueness of the eqUIlIbrium and convergence of the iterative algorithm to 
the equilIbrium were presented. Finally, simulatIOn results demonstratmg 
the effect of uncertamty on the performance of the game were presented. 
The interesting effect of Improvement m sum-rate with hIgher channel un-
certamty bounds was observed in the sImulation results and IS the focus of 
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analysis in the next chapter. 
Appendix 4.A Proof of Theorem 4.1 
The optimizatIOn problem in (4.4.1) is convex and admits a unique solution 
since the cost function is strictly concave for Pq > O. The Lagranglan C. for 
this problem can be written as, 
N ( pq(k) ) 
C. = (; log 1 + <pq(k) 
N N (4 AI) 
- L vkPq(k)+ L.\k (pq(k) - p';"'X(k)) , 
k=l k=l 
where <pq(k) IS defined m (444). Note that <Pq(k) IS mdependent of the 
optimization variable Pq (k). 
The KKT optimallty conditions [Refer Appendix 3 AJ for problem (4 4.1) 
are 
pq(k) ;::: 0; pq(k) ::; p~ax(k), 
.\k (pq(k) - p~ax(k)) = 0, vkPq(k) = 0, 
N 
Lpq(k) = 1. 
k=l 
fork=I, . . ,N 
(4 A.2) 
(4 A.3) 
(4 A 4) 
(4 A.5) 
(4 A.6) 
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To avoid the problem becoming mfeaslble or havmg the trivial solution 
pq(k) = p~ax(k) Vk, It IS assumed that Ef=lp~ax > 1. From constramt 
(4.A.6), pq(k) > 0 for at least one k. Smce cI>q(k) > 0, it implies that 
-1/ /-Iq - Vk + Ak < O. Further, at any instance, at most one among Ak 
and Vk can be non-zero for a feasible solution, based on the complementary 
slackness conditions in (4 A 5) which implies that /-Iq > 0 
When 0 < pq(k) < P;=(k), Ak = 0 and Vk = 0, from the complementary 
slackness conditions in (4 A 5). Thus, from (4 A 2) 
(4 A.7) 
which gives 
pq(k) = /-Iq - cI>q(k), (4.A.8) 
where /-Iq is chosen such that constraint (4.A 6) IS satisfied. SubstJtutmg for 
cI>q(k) from (444) and including the boundary values 0 and p~(k), the 
optimum power allocation for the problem (PI) IS the following waterfilling 
solution' 
p~(k) = [/-Iq - <7~(k) - L Frq(k)Pr(k) - fq 
r#q 
p;'Il:l:(k) cL---p-~(-k )] 
r#q 0 
(4.A.9) 
o 
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Appendix 4.B Proof of Lemma 4.1 
Given the waterfilhng mapping RWFS( ) defined as 
(4.B.1) 
where 'P ~ 'PI X . x 'PQ, with 'Pq and RWP~(p_q) respectively defined m 
(4.32) and (4.4 6), the block-maxnnum norm is defined as [62] 
(4 B.2) 
where w ~ [W., ... , wQjT > ° IS any pOSitive weight vector. The vector 
weighted maJ<lmum norm is gIVen by [107] 
11 Ilw 1>. Ixql x oovec - max-, 
, qEf! Wq 
w>o, XERQ (4.B 3) 
The matrix weighted maJ<lmum norm IS given by [107] 
Q IIAII~m.t ~ max~ E i[A]qrlwr, 
, q Wq r=l 
(4 B 4) 
The mappmg RWpSO is said to be a block-contraction4 with modulus 
Cl< With respect to the norm 11· II;'block II there exlStS Cl< E [0,1) such that, 
4The mapping T IS called a block-contractIOn With modulus Cl E [0, 1) If it IS a 
contraction III the block-maximum norm With modulus Cl [62). 
Section 4 B Proof of Lemma 4 1 101 
where pC') = (p~.), . ,p~')) for i = 1,2. 
GivenfJ') = [v'Er;iqrr{l}('), .. ,,,;cE-r;i-q-p::C~{'--N-:-:}C""")lT for~ = 1,2, for each 
q E n, let Mq ~ IlfJI) - fJ2) 112 and p_q{k}(') ~ [PI (k}C'), .. ,pq_l{k}C'), 
pq+1{k}(·), ... ,PQ{k}(')] Then, 
1 
Llfq = [t ( 2:>~{k}CI) _ Lrr{k}(2)) 2] " , {4 B 6} 
k=1 r;iq r;iq 
1 
= [~(llp-q{k}CI)112 -llp-q{k}(2)112t]", {4.B.7} 
1 :5l~ IIp-q{k}CI) - P_q{k}(2) 11:] 2 , {4 B 8} 
1 
= [tL (p~{k}CI) +p~{k}(2) _ 2pr{k}CI)pr{k}C2))]", {4.B.9} 
k=1 r;iq 
1 
= [L Ilp~l) - p~2)II:r {4.B.1O} 
r;iq 
where {4 B 8} follows from [107, Lemma 5.1 2J. Now, define for each q E n, 
eRWF~ ~ 11 RWF~ (p~~) - RWF~ (p~~) 112, 
eq ~ Ilp~!) - p~2)112· 
{4 B 11} 
{4.B.12} 
• 
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Then, usmg (446) In (4 B.Il), eRWFs can be wrItten as 
q 
eRWF~ = 11 [ - O'q - L:r;,qFrqp~Il - fqfJ1l]pq 
-[ -O'q- Er;'qFrqp~2l -fqfJ2l]pqt (4.B.13) 
~ 11 Er;,qFrqPPl +fqfJ1l - Er;'qFrqp~2l - fqfJ2l l1 2, (4 B 14) 
= 112: Frq (p~ll - p~2l) + fq (fJ1l - fJ2l) 11 ' (4.B.15) 
r;'q 2 
~ 112: Frq (p~ll - p~2l) 11 + fqllfJ1l - fJ2l112' (4 B 16) 
r;'q 2 
1 ~ 112: Frq (p~ll - p~2l) 112 + fq [2: Ilp~ll _ p~2lll:] '(4.B.17) 
r;'q r;'q 
~ 2: (mt" Frq(k)) Ilp~ll - p~2t 
r;'q 
1 
+ fq [2: Ilp~ll _ p~2lll:]' , (4.B.18) 
r;'q 
(4 B 19) 
(4 B 20) 
'V p~ll, p~2l E 'Pq and 'V q E n, where: (4 B.14) follows from the nonexpanSIve 
property of the waterfillmg projection [92, Lemma 3J; (4 B.16) follows from 
the triangle inequalIty [107], (4 B.17) follows from (4 B 10); (4.B.18) and 
(4 B.19) follow from the defimtions of F rq and eq respectIvely from (4.4 7) 
and (4 B.12); and (4.B 20) follows from the defimtion of smax In (4.4 12) 
and Jensen's IneqUalIty [51J 
---------------------
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The set of inequalities in (4.B 20) can be written in vector form as 
(4.B.21) 
where E is defined in (4.4.11) and the vectors eRWFs and e are defined as 
(4.B 22) 
Usmg the vector and matrix weighted maxJmum norms from (4.B.3) and 
(4 B.4) respectively, (4 B 21) can be written as 
IleRWFS 11:,vec ::; II {smax + E)ell:,vec' 
::; IISmax + EIC:,mat '1Iell:,vec' 
(4 B 23) 
(4.B 24) 
11 w > O. Usmg the block-maximum norm (4.B.2), 
IleRwFsll:,vec = I1 RWFs (p(I)) - RWFs (p(2))II;'block' (4 B 25) 
::; liS""'" + EII:,matllp~l) - p~2)II;block' (4.B.26) 
IIp(2) , p(2) E P, with E and S as defined in (4.4 11) and (4.4 12) respectively. 
It is clear that RWFsO is a block contraction when IISmax + EII:::',mat < 
1. D 
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Appendix 4.C Proof of Theorem 4.2 
From [108], every concave game5 has at least one eqUilibrium. For the game 
<§.S. 
rob' 
1. The set of feasible strategy profiles, Pq of each player q is compact 
and convex 
2. The payoff functIOn of each player q in (4 3 6) IS continuous in pEP 
and concave in Pq E Pq• 
Thus, the game W.~b has at least one eqUilibrium. From Lemma 4 1, the 
waterfilhng mapping RWFS(-) IS a block-contraction If (4.4.14) IS satisfied 
for some w > 0 Thus, the robust-optimizatIOn equilibrium of game r,;/{,b IS 
unique (using [63, Theorem 1]). Since smax + E is a nonnegative matrix, 
there exists a positive vector w such that 
I/smax + EII!,m.t < 1 (4 C.l) 
Usmg [62, Corollary 61] and the triangle inequality [107], this is satISfied 
when 
I/smaxl/!,m.t + IIEI/!,m.t < 1 go p(smax) < 1 - p(E). (4 C.2) 
o 
5 A game IS srud to be concave if the payoff functions are concave and the sets of 
admiSSible strategtes are compact and convex 
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Appendix 4.0 Proof of Theorem 4.3 
From Lemma 4.1 and (4.C.1) the waterfillmg mapping RWFS() IS a block-
contraction. From [63, Theorem 2], the robust iterative waterfilhng algo-
rIthm descrIbed in Algorithm 4 1 converges to the unique robust-optImizatIOn 
eqUIlIbrium of game r9'r~b for any set of feasible mitial conditions and any up-
date schedule. 
Chapter 5 
SUM-RATE ANALYSIS IN 
THE TWO-USER SCENARIO 
In this chapter, the effect of uncertamty on the sum-rate and efficiency of the 
system for the two-user scenario in the game r9'r~b presented in the previous 
chapter is analysed (Refer to SectIOn 2.3 for a discussion on equilibrium 
efficiency). The sum-rate of the system, S, is given by 
Q 
S= 2:Rq. (50.1) 
q=l 
where Rq IS the information rate of user q as defined m (42.5). In game 
<§,~b' the price of stablhty and anarchy are the same under the sufficient 
conditions in Theorem 4.2 due to the eXistence of a unique eqUlhbnum. 
Thus, the price of anarchy, PoA, defined as the ratio of the sum-rate of the 
system at the social optimal solution, S', and the sum-rate of the system at 
106 
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the robust-optimization equihbrium, grab, is given by 
s' 
PoA = srob . 
107 
(5.02) 
Note that a lower pnce of anarchy indicates that the robust-optimization 
eqUlhbrium is more effiCIent. 
For the two user case in the game f1r~b' the worst-case interference in 
each frequency reduces to (Frq(k) +€q)Pr(k) wIth q, r = 1,2 and q i- r. This 
means that the robust waterfiIling operation for the two user case (Q = 2) 
is simply the standard waterfiIling solutIOn wIth the worst-case channel co-
efficients. For the sake of clarIty, the analysis here is restncted to both users 
having identical noise variance al(k) = a~(k) = a2 Vk across all frequencies, 
identical uncertainty bounds €l = €2 = € and identical total power con-
straints :Ei:"=IPI(k) = :Ei:"=IP2(k) = PT The results presented here can be 
extended to the non-identIcal case along similar hnes. In order to develop a 
clear understanding of the the behaviour of the eqUlhbrlUm, the sum-rate of 
the system is first analyzed for a system with two frequencies (N = 2) and 
then extended to systems wIth large (N -+ 00) number of frequencies. 
5.1 Two frequency case (N = 2) 
Consider a two-frequency antI-symmetric system as shown in FIgure 5 1 
where the channel gains are IHll {1)12 = IHll(2)12 = 1, IH22 (1)12 = IH22 (2)12 = 
1, IH,2(2)12 = IH21(1)12 = a and !H12(1)12 = IH21(2)12 = ma with m > 1 
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Tx 1 
[1,1] 
Rx 1 
....... . ...... [ma, a] 
.: ........ :::::::: ..• ::::::: ........................................................... ::::::: .••.. ::::::: .. 
[1,1] 
Tx2 Rx2 
Figure 5.1: Anti-symmetric system with Q = 2, N = 2, El = E2 = E. 
The noise variances for both users in both frequencies are (12. The 
channel gains are: IHll (1W = IHll (2W = IH22 (1W = IH22 (2)12 = 
1; IHI2 (2)12 = IH21 (1)12 = a and IHI2 (1)12 = IH21 (2)12 = ma with 
m > 1 and 0 < a < 1. The power allocations for this system at the 
robust-optimization equilibrium are presented in (5. 1.1). 
and 0 < a < l. The total power constraint for the two users is PI (l )+PI (2) = 
1 and P2(l)+P2(2) = l. From (4.4.3) the power allocations at the equilibrium 
PI (1) = (f.LI - (12 - (a + €)P2(l)t, 
PI(2) = (f.LI - (12 - (ma + <)P2(2))+, 
P2(1) = (f.L2 - (12 - (ma + <)PI(l ))+, 
P2(2) = (f.L2 - ,,2 - (a + €)PI(2)) + 
(5.1.1) 
The following theorem presents the effect of uncertainty on the slim-rate and 
price of anarchy of the system for the high interference and low interference 
cases: 
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THEOREM 5.1 For the two-user two-frequency antt-symmetT'!c system de-
sCT'!bed m F'gure 5.1: 
• H'gh ,nterference: When (72 « a(l-p), the sum-rate mcreases and the 
pT'!ce of anarchy decreases as the channel uncerta,nty bound mcreases. 
• Low mterference' When (72 » map, the sum-rate decreases and the 
price of anarchy mcreases as the channel uncerta,nty bound mcreases. 
Proof. See Appendix 5 A o 
From this result, It is evident that the robust-optimization eqUIlibrium 
behaves in opposite ways when there is high interference and when there is 
low Interference In the system. ThiS suggests that there might be a certain 
level of interference where the sum-rate and price of anarchy do not change 
with change In uncertainty. This is given by the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5.1. At the level of mterference 01=010 , where 
(72 (( 2 4m)! ) 010 = 2m (m+l) +~ -m-l, (5.1.2) 
the sum-rate and the price of anarchy are mdependent of the level of uncer-
tamty or the power allocatzon used. Furthermore, at th,s value of mterfer-
ence, the pT'!ce of anarchy,s equal to umty. 
Proof. See Appendix 5.B o 
It can be seen that even for such a simple system, the global behaviour of 
the robust-optimization equilibrium appears to be quite complex. This m-
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dicates that the global properties of the robust-optinnzatlOn equilibrium for 
larger systems IS quite strongly dependent on the level of interference m the 
system, which is seen in the subsequent results for systems with large num-
ber of frequencies. However, the underlying behaviour of the eqUilibrium for 
the two-frequency case is that the eqUilibrium moves towards the frequency 
division multiple access (FDMA) solution as the uncertainty bound increases 
(from (5.A 2» This helps in providing a way to analyze the eqUilibrIUm be-
haVIOur for systems with large number of frequencies in the following section. 
5.2 Large number of frequencies (N -+ 00) 
In thiS section, the equilibnum behavIOur is characterized for the two-user 
system with a large number of frequencies As seen from the previous section, 
the equilibrIUm tends to move towards the FDMA solution as uncertainty 
bound mcreases In order to quantify thiS effect, the quantity J(k), defined 
as 
(52.1) 
is used as a measure ofthe extent of partitioning of the frequency k between 
the two users. It is mmimum (J(k) = -1) when both the users allocate all 
their total power to the same frequency k and 18 maximum (J(k) = 0) when 
at most one user is occupying the frequency k. Note that J(k) = 0 'Vk E 
{I, ., N} when the users adopt an FDMA scheme. 
The following lemma descnbes the effect of the uncertamty bound on 
the extent of partitioning of the system: 
Section 52 large number of frequencies (N --+ 00) 111 
LEMMA 5.1. For the two-user case In the game ffr~b' when the number of 
frequenctes, N -> 00, the extent of partttwnlng In every frequency tS non-
decreasing as the uncertainty bound of the system Increases for any set of 
channel values, t.e., 
:, J{k) ~ 0 'Vk E {I, ... , N} when N -> 00, (5.22) 
W'lth equality for frequencies where J{k) = 0, where J{k) is defined In (5.2.1). 
Proof. See Appendix 5.C. o 
The above lemma suggests that the robust-optimizatIOn equilibrium moves 
towards greater frequency-space partJtionmg as the uncertamty bound m-
creases when there is a large number of frequencies in the system. In other 
words, the equilibrium is movmg closer to an FDMA solution under increased 
channel uncertamty. When the FDMA solution is globally (sum-rate) op-
tlmal, this will lead to an improvement in the sum-rate at the equihbrium. 
ThiS IS stated in the following theorem' 
THEOREM 5.2. For the two-user case In the game ffr~b' as the number of fre-
quencies, N -> 00, the sum-rote (Price of anarchy) at the robust-optimizatIOn 
eqUilibrium of the system IS non-decreasing (non-increasing) as the uncer-
tainty bound Increases If, 'V k E {I, ... , N}, 
(5.2.3) 
Proof. See AppendIX 5.D. o 
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For the special case of frequency-flat systems, at the eqUilibrium, all 
users have equal power allocation to all frequencies. This solution is not 
dependent on the uncertainty in the CSI This leads to no change in the 
extent of partitionmg and thus sum-rate and price of anarchy are not affected 
by uncertamty. 
Also, the results of this section are not just limited to the robust-optimization 
eqUilibrium for the system presented here. When the uncertainty € = 0, the 
framework presented here can be used to analyse the behaviour of the N ash 
equilibrium of the iterative waterfillmg algorithm as a function of the inter-
ference coeffiCients. 
5.3 Simulation results 
In thiS section, some simulation results to study the impact of channel un-
certainty on the eqUilibrium are presented Figure 5.2 shows the simulation 
results for the two user and two frequency scenario and Figure 5 3 shows the 
results for a two user case With N = 8 frequencies. 
The sum-rate of the system m Figure 5 1 under high interference condi-
tions is plotted as a function of mterference and uncertamty in Figure 5 2a. 
The flat regIOn corresponds to the sum-rate at Pareto optimal solution 
(FDMA) and the edge of the surface corresponds to the sufficient condition 
in (452). It can be seen that the Nash eqUilibrium (when the uncertainty 
bound f = 0) moves closer to the Pareto optimal solution as the interference 
increases. It IS also evident that the sum-rate increases for a fixed interfer-
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results for the anti-symmetric system in Fig-
ure 5.1. Note t hat the zero uncertainty corresponds to t he Nash equi-
librium 
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Figure 5.3: Simulation results demonstrating the effect of channel un-
certainty on (a) Sum-ra te, (b) Average number of channels/user, (c) 
Average number of iterations for a system with (J = 0.1 , Q = 2 
users and N = 8 frequencies averaged over 1000 runs. Channel gains 
Hrq(k ) ~ Nc(O, I) for 7' f. q, Hqq (k) ~ Nc(0,4). Channel un-
certainty model: nominal value F,.q(k) = Fr~u·(k) ( l + erq(k )) with 
erq(k ) ~ U( -~ , ~ ), 0 < l. The simulations are limited to channels 
which satisfy the sufficiency condit ion in (4.5.2). lote that t he zero 
uncertainty solution corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. 
ence as uncertainty increases, as expected from Theorem 5.1. In Figure 5.2b, 
the sum-rate at low interference is plot ted as a function of interference and 
uncertainty. As expected from Theorem 5.1 , the sum-rate decreases as the 
uncertainty bound increases. Simulation results similar to those in Sec-
tion 4.7 for a two-user system with 8 frequencies are presented in Figure 5.3. 
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As seen before, improvement m sum-rate due to lower channel occupancy 
leads to a trade-off in increased number of iterations to convergence. 
From these simulations it can be seen that the analytical results derived 
in Section 5.2 for very large number of frequencies also hold true for a fi-
nite number of frequencies. From the simulation results and the theoretical 
analysIS, It can be concluded that the robust-optimization equilibrium moves 
towards an FDMA solutIon as the uncertainty bound increases. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the efficiency ofthe eqUliIbrmm ofthe robust rate-maximizatlOn 
game proposed in Chapter 4 was mvestigated for the two-user scenarIO. In 
order to develop a clearer understanding of the behaviour of the eqUliIbrium, 
a sImple two-frequency system was first analyzed The effect of uncertainty 
on the sum-rate and the price of anarchy of th,s two-frequency system were 
derIved for two regimes, VIZ. high interference and low mterference. Fol-
lowmg this, the effect of uncertainty on the sum-rate and price of anarchy 
of a two-user system WIth asymptotically large number of frequencies were 
characterized. Finally, these effects were demonstrated through SImulation 
results. 
Appendix 5.A Proof of Theorem 5.1 
Let PI(1) = p. Hence, by symmetry, PI(2) = 112(1) = 1 - p, 112(2) = P and 
ILl = IL2 = IL Consider the mterIor operating points ofthe robust waterfilling 
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operator RWF~(-) where It is hnear. Eliminatmg f.L from (5.1.1), 
1-a-e 
p = ( a) > 0.5. 2 1 - (m + 1)2 - e - (5 A.1) 
The gradient of p wIth respect to e is 
8p (m-1)a 0 
- 2> . 
8e 4(1 - (m + 1)~ - e) (5.A.2) 
Thus, the robust-optimIzation equilibrIUm moves towards the FDMA solu-
tion as the uncertainty bound mcreases 
The slgnal-to-mterference-plus-noise ratIO (SINR) for the two users m 
the two frequency bms IS gIven by 
SINRl(1) = SINR2(2) = 2 p( )' 
a +a1-p 
1-p 
SINR1(2) = SINR2(1) = ""'2;;---'---
a +map 
and the sum-rate of the system is 
A ( P) ( 1- P ) S = 2 log 1 + 2 ( ) + 2 log 1 + 2 • 
a +a 1-p a +map 
Case 1: High interference scenario 
(5 A.3) 
(5.A.4) 
(5 A.5) 
In the high interference scenario, a2 « a(1 - p). Let e = p/a(1 - p) Then, 
the SINR for the two users in the two frequency bins can be approximated 
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as 
(5.A.6) 
The sum-rate of the system at lugh interference can be approximated as 
(5 A.7) 
(5.A.8) 
The goal here is to analyse the behaviour ofthe sum-rate S as the uncer-
tamty e mcreases. To this end, It has to be shown that the gradIent of the 
sum-rate with respect to e is posItIve Smce log(x} mcreases monotomcally 
WIth x, consider 
a 1 ( 1) at; 
- t;+-- - 1--- -a e ( ma2t;) - ma2 t;2 a e' 
= (1 _ (1 -p}2) at; 
mr ae' 
(I-pi' and (1 - mp ) > 0 SInce P ~ 0.5 and m > 1. Now, 
at; 1 ap 
ae = a(1- p}2 ae . 
From (5.A.2), (5.A.9) and (5.A.10), 
as 
"'1h > O. 
(5.A.9) 
(5.A.10) 
(5.A.ll) 
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Thus, the sum-rate of the system increases as the uncertamty € mcreases. 
This also shows that the robust-optimization eqUilibrIUm achieves a higher 
sum-rate in the presence of channel uncertainty (€ > 0) than the Nash eqUi-
librium at zero uncertainty (€ = 0). 
The social optimal solution for this system at high interference IS fre-
quency division multlplexing [23[ In other words, the frequency space is 
fully partitiOned at the SOCial optimal solution. The sum-rate at the social 
optimal solution for the given system at high interference, S', is given by 
(5 A.12) 
The price of anarchy at high interference, PoA, IS 
P A 
_ log (1+ ;!,-) 
o - I I' 
log (1 + ma' + e + ma'e) (5 A.13) 
Since & S > 0 It Implies that & PoA < 0 tri ' ---aE 
Case 2: Low interference scenario 
In the low interference scenario, i.e. when map « ,,2, the signal-to-interference+nOlse 
ratio SINR for the two users in the two frequency bins can be approximately 
written as 
(5 A 14) 
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The sum-rate of the system at Iow mterference can be approXImated as 
(5.A.15) 
(5 A 16) 
Now, 
DS = (1+~+P-P2)-1 (1-2p)Dp <0. 
DE ".2".2 ".2 DE 
(5 A 17) 
At Iow interference, the system behaves similar to a parallel Gausslan 
channel system. The SOCial optimal solution in this scenario IS the waterfiIl-
ing solutIOn and leads to equal power allocation to both bins. The sum-rate 
at the social optimal solution for the given system at Iow interference, S', 
is given by 
S' = 4 log (1 + 2!2). (5 A 18) 
The price of anarchy at Iow mterference, PoA, is 
P A- 4Iog(1+~) _ log(1+~+~) 
o - 2 log (1 + ~ + p~t) - log (1 + ~ + p~f'). (5 A.19) 
Note that, at Iow interference, map « 1. From (5 A.l), p "" 0 5. Thus 
the PoA is close to unity. Since ¥. < 0, f. PoA > O. o 
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Appendix 5.B Proof of Proposition 5.1 
The gradient of the sum-rate 8rob with respect to E is 
B8roo B8rob Bp 
~=fiP BE' 
From (5.A 2), we have ~ > 0. Now, 
I + "v B 8rob _ 2 u'+<>(1 p) (u'+<>(1 
Bp - 1 + u,+<>'h p) 
Setting ~~tb = 0, we solve for a to get the following roots, 
0, 
a= ;::: (m+1±(4m/0'2+{m+1J2)~), 
,,'(2p-l) 
(m 1)P"+2p-l' 
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(5 B.1) 
(5.B.2) 
(5 B 3) 
The posItive root that is mdependent of E and p {which is a functIOn of the 
uncertainty E, from (5.A.1)) is the required solution where the sum-rate IS 
constant regardless of uncertainty. Thus, the required interference value is 
given by 
(5 B.4) 
Smce the root ao of ~;Qb is independent of p, different power allocatIOn 
schemes (resulting in different values of p) will result in the same sum-rate 
at a = ao. Thus, the price of anarchy at a = ao is unity. o 
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Appendix 5.C Proof of Lemma 5.1 
From (4.4 3), the power allocations for the two users at the robust-optimization 
equilibrium m the kth frequency are 
PI(k) = (1'1 _<12 - (F21 + f)P2(k)t, 
P2(k) = (1'2-<12-(FI2 +f)PI(k)t, 
(5 C.1) 
(5.C.2) 
Let VJ, V2 and Vol be the sets of frequencies exclusively used by user 
1, user 2 and by both respectively and nl g, IVII and n2 g, IV21 be the 
number of frequencies exclusively used by user 1 and user 2 respectively at 
the equilibrium. Then, from (5.C.1), PI(k) = 1'1-<1~ and P2(k) = 0 V k E VI 
and PI(k) = 0 and P2(k) = 1'2 - <1~ V k E V2. The power remammg for 
allocation to the frequencies m Vol g, {kJ, ... , kol} by user 1 and user 2 is 
This separation of the frequency-space into exclusive-use and overlapped-
use frequencies allows us to analyse the system Without the nonlinear opera-
tIOn (.)+. Thus, the power allocatIOns at the fixed point in the overlapped-use 
frequency-space can be expressed as a system of linear equations, 
PI(k) + (F2I(k) + f)P2(k) -1'1 _<12 = 0, k E Vol 
(FI2(k) + f)PI(k) + P2(k) -1'2 - <12 = 0, k E Vol 
(5 C.3) 
(5 C 4) 
(5.C.5) 
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(5.C 6) 
Writmg these in matrIX form, 
= (5 C.7) 
o Akol -12 p(kol) 
12 D p, Pt 
where 
(5 C.S) 
Let 
Akl 0 -12 
A§. , B§. 
0 Akol -12 
(5 C.9) 
p(kl) 
C §. [12 .. 12J and P§' 
p(kol ) 
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so that (5 C 7) can be written as 
[~ :] [:] = [:J . (5 C 10) 
This system can be solved to get 
where 
(5.C 12) 
Using [109, Fact 10.1291 and differentiating (5.C 11) with respect to f, 
! [:] = - [~ :f [I~A :] [~ :r1 [:J, (5C.13) 
= - [~ :] [I~A :] [~ :] [:J, (5.C.14) 
= _ [W(B. A)X Pt] 
Y(B.A)X Pt 
(5.C.15) 
Due to the nature of the waterfiIling functIOn, nl and n2 are non-decreasmg 
piecewise-constant functions of f. The above derIvative exists only m the 
regions where nl and n2 are constant Using [109, Proposition 2.8.71, the 
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paxtitioned matrIX Inverse can be WrItten as 
Using 
w = A-I + A -IB(D - CA -IB)-ICA-1, 
X = -A -IB(D - CA -IB)-I, 
Y = -(D-CA-1B)-ICA-1, 
Z = (D-CA-IB)-I. 
o 
A-I = 
o 
125 
(5 C.16) 
(5.C 17) 
(5.C 18) 
(5.C 19) 
(5 C.20) 
It can be shown that (the detailed derIvations axe provided at the end of tills 
proof), 
w= 
x= 
_A-1ZA-1 k", k, 
A-1Z k, 
A-1Z 
kol 
y = - [ZAk,1 .. ZA;;;!] , 
(5.C.21) 
(5 C.22) 
(5.C.23) 
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(5 C.24) 
where 
(5 C.27) 
Thus, from (5.C.11) and (5.C.15), 
(5 C.28) 
and 
8P = _W(8A)X, 
{h 8€ (5 C 29) 
kol 
~ A-1ZA-1GA-1Z _ A-1GA-1Z L... k, • • Pt k, k,Pt 
1=kl 
= , (5.C.30) 
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where 
'rft = 1, . . ,N. (5.C.31) 
Therefore, for k = kI, ... , kot, 
[
PI (k)] -1 
p(k) = = Ak ZPt 
1'2(k) 
(5.C.32) 
and 
8 
p'(k) = 8E p(k), (5.C.33) 
= [:~~:~], (5.C.34) 
k o• 
= LA;;IZA,-IGA;-IZpt - A;;IGA;;IZpt , (5.C.35) 
t=kl 
ko• 
= A;;IZ LA;-IGA;-IZpt - A;;IGA;;IZpt (5.C 36) 
t=kl 
ConsIder the extent of partitioning J (k) at any frequency k. For fre-
quencies where J(k) = 0, at least one of the users has zero power allocatIOn 
and that wIll not change wIth change m uncertamty Thus I. J(k) = 0 for 
k E VI U V 2• Also, in cases when nI or n2 change due to some frequency k 
dropping from the set VoI, J(k) increases from some negative value to zero. 
Now consider the extent of partItIoning for frequencies where both users 
have non-zero power allocation DIfferentIating the extent of partitioning for 
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frequency k E Dol with respect to E, 
8 8 
8E J(k) = BE (-Pl(k)P2(k)) , 
= -P~(k)P2(k) +Pl(k)p~(k), 
= - [:~:~r [:~~:~] , 
= _ [PI (k)] T [0 1] [Pi(k)] , 
P2(k) 1 0 ~(k) 
= _p(k)TGp'(k), 
T 
= _(A;;lZPt) G( _A;;lGA;;lZPt 
ko' 
+A;;lZ L A;-lGA;-lZPt), 
t=kl 
ko• 
= ptTZTA;;lTGA;;l( - Z L A;-lGA;-lG-1Ak 
t=kl 
+I)GA;;lZPt 
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(5 C.37) 
(5.C 38) 
(5 C.39) 
(5 C.40) 
(5.C.41) 
(5 C 42) 
(5.C 43) 
Let qk ,g, GAk1ZPt. Using GT = G-l = G, GA;-lG = A;-T and GAkG = 
A[, (5 C.43) can be wrItten as 
(5.C.44) 
Let Mk = l:::kl A;-l A;-T A[ and Qk = A;;l_A;;lZMk. When nol = o(N) 
(i.e., when limN_oo T!ff = 0), the total number of frequencies, nl + n2 = 
O(N). Since A;-l A;-T A[ = 0(1) for each t and k, Mk = O(nol) and 
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Z = O(l/N). Thus, 
lim A;;lZMk = 0 
N-oo 
(5 C 45) 
which means that 
(5 C.46) 
from the convergence condition. Thus, XTQkX > 0 '<Ix E IR2X! as Its sym-
metnc part Qk + Qf IS posItive definite [107]. Hence, f. J(k) ~ 0 when 
N -> 00, with equality when J(k) = O. 
Derivation of Inverses 
Consider 
o 
(5 C.47) 
o 
(5 C.48) 
(5 C.4g) 
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where ~. IS defined in (5 C.25). Thus, 
(5.C.50) 
and 
(5.C.51) 
where 2i is defined in (5.C.26). Therefore, 
x = -A -IB(D - CA -lB)-1 (5 C.52) 
A-I 
kl o Z 
= (5 C 53) 
0 A-I Z kol 
A-IZ 
kl 
= (5 C 54) 
A-IZ 
kol 
and 
(5 C 55) 
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0 
= - [Z ... Z] (5.C.56) 
o A-I k" 
= - [ZAkll ... ZAk'~] (5 C.57) 
Also, 
w - A -I = A -IB(D _ CA -IB)-ICA-I (5 C 58) 
T 
A-I kl 0 -12 ZA-
I 
kl 
= (5.C.59) 
0 A-I k" -12 ZA-
I 
k" 
= - (5 C 60) 
A-IZA-I 
kl kl 
A-IZA-I 
kl kor 
= (5 C 61) 
A-IZA-I 
kor kl 
A-IZA-I 
kor kot 
Hence, 
(5.C.62) 
o A-IZA-I kl kot 
= (5 C.63) 
o A-IZA-I kot kl A-IZA-
I 
kol kot 
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= (5C 64) 
A-1- A-1ZA-1 
kol kol kol 
o 
Appendix 5.0 Proof of Theorem 5.2 
Using [23, Corollary 3 1J, the sum of the rates of the two users in the fre-
quency k IS quasi-convex only If F2I(k)FI2(k) > 1/4. Let C be the min-
Imum number of frequencies occupied by any user. When there are only 
two users and a large number of frequencies, C » 1. If the condition 
F2I(k)FI2(k) > !{1 + 0:1)2 IS satisfied for some C 2: 2 for all frequen-
cies k E {1, .. ,N} (thus satisfying F2I(k)FI2(k) > 1/4), then the Pareto 
optimal solution is FDMA [23, Theorem 3.3J. This needs to be satisfied for 
the worst-case channel coefficients which leads to (5 2 3). Thus, the solution 
moving closer to FDMA will improve the sum-rate of the system. From 
Lemma 5.1, the robust equihbrium moves closer to FDMA as uncertainty 
increases and thus will result m an llllprovement in sum-rate. 
The Pareto optimal solution under this condition (which is FDMA) is 
constant under varying uncertainty bounds as such an uncertainty in the 
interference coefficients FI2 (k) and F21 (k) does not affect the FD MA solution 
where there IS no mterference Thus, an mcrease in sum-rate will result m 
an decrease in price of anarchy o 
Chapter 6 
ROBUST IWFA FOR MIMO 
SYSTEMS 
In chapters 4 and 5, a robust rate-maxImlzation game m SISO frequency-
selective Gausslan interference channels under bounded channel uncertainty 
was presented and analyzed In this chapter, a robust framework for rate-
maximlzation games in multi-antenna systems (MIMO Gaussian interference 
channels) based on the robust game model is presented. 
The chapter begms with a description of the system model under which 
the robust waterfilling solution is developed. This IS followed by the formu-
lation of the robust MIMO rate-maximization game under bounded chan-
nel uncertainty This framework IS shown to be a modified MIMO rate-
maximization game (Section 3 5). The equihbnum for thiS game IS then 
presented, along with an Iterative waterfilling algorithm to compute It Suf-
ficient conditions for the umqueness of the eqUilibrium and convergence of 
the algorithm are then presented. Finally, simulatIOn results are presented 
to demonstrate the behaviour of the algonthm. 
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6.1 System model 
Consider a MIMO Gaussian interference channel composed of Q MIMO 
links. The signal vector Yq E CnR,xl measured at the receiver of user q 
IS 
Yq = Hqqxq + L Hrqxr + nq 
r#q 
(6.1.1) 
where Hqq E CnR, xnT, is the direct-channel matrIX between source q and 
destination q, Hrq E CnR, xnT, is the cross-channel matrix between source 
rand destmation q, Xq E CnT,XI is the Signal vector transmitted by source 
q and nq E CnR, xl IS the receiver noise vector of user q, which is assumed 
to be a zero-mean complex Gaussian vector with an arbitrary (nonsingular) 
covariance matrIX Rn,. The second term in the right hand side of (6.1.1) 
is the multi-user interference (MUI) observed at the destination q, which is 
treated as additive spatially coloured noise at the receiver of user q. 
The system is assumed to be quasi-stationary for the duratIOn of the 
transmission. Each receiver is assumed to be able to measure accurately 
the covariance matrIX of the nOise plus MUI generated by the other users 
The direct-channel matrix Hqq is assumed to be square and nonsmgular. 
It is estimated by receiver of user q and is assumed to have a bounded 
uncertainty of unknown distribution The uncertainty set 1iq of the direct-
channel matrix Hqq is determmlStlcally modelled as an ellipsoid centered 
around the nominal value H qq , 
(61.2) 
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Based on this informatIOn, each destination q computes the optimal co-
variance matrix Qq £ E{ XqxH } for its own link and transmits it back to 
its transnutter over a low bit-rate error-free feedback channel. From this 
optimal covarlance matrix, the beamformer weights of the transmitter can 
be computed as 
nT, 
Xq = EAq,Vq, 
l=1 
(6.1.3) 
where ~q, is the .-th eigenvalue of Qq and vq, is its associated eigenvector. 
The nominal information rate of user q, Rq(Qq, Q_q), for this system 
can be written as [63] 
where 
R_q(Q_q) £ Rn, + LHrqQrH~ 
r;'q 
(6.1.4) 
(615) 
is the interference plus noise covarlance matrIX observed by destmation q, 
and Q_q £ {Qr }r;'q IS the set of covariance matrices of all users except the 
q-th user Each player q competes rationally agamst other users in order to 
maximize its own information rate Rq (Qq, Q_q) by designing the optimal 
covarlance matrIX Q~, given the constramt 
(6.16) 
where Pq IS the maximum average power transmitted m units of energy per 
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transmission for user g 
6.2 Robust rate-maximization game formulation 
The robust game model (Section 2.5) suggests that when players have un-
certaintIes in their payoff functions, formulatmg their best response to the 
worst-case payoff functions leads to a stable eqmhbrium. MotIvated by thIs 
approach, a protectwn Junetton (whIch is a lower bound on the payoff func-
tion) is formulated for each user, whICh IS then maximized by each user. 
Defining the matrices Mq and Eq as 
Mq ~ H~R:~{Q_q)Hqq, 
Eq ~ 1+ H;q1,.l.q, 
(6.21) 
(6.2.2) 
the protectIOn function for user g, based on the channel uncertamty model 
in (6 1.2), IS formulated as 
- -H -1 -Rq{Qq, Q_q) = logdet{I + HqqR_q{Q_q)HqqQq), 
= logdet{I + E:MqEqQq), 
nq 
= 'Llog >.,{I+ E:MqEqQq), 
1=1 
nq 
= 'L log(1+>.,{E:EqM qQq»), 
1=1 
nq 
2: 'L log(1+>'mm{E:Eq)>.,{MqQq»). 
1=1 
(6.23) 
(6.2.4) 
(62.5) 
(6.26) 
(6.2.7) 
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where (6.2 4) follows from (6.2 1) and (62.2); (6.2.5) follows from [107. The-
orem 1.2.12]; (62 6) follows from Weyl's Theorem [107. Theorem 43 1], 1 
and (62.7) follows from [109. Fact 8 19.17].2 
Now. 
~mlD(E:Eq) = ~Dlln(I + a:H~qH + H~qlaq 
+a: H~qH H~ql a q). 
~ 1+~mm(a:H~qH + HW1aq) 
+~mlD(a:H~qHH~qlaq). 
~ 1- 2CTmax(H~laq) 
+~mm (a: H~qHH~ql a q). 
~ 1 - 2CTmax(H~ql a q) 
(6.28) 
(62.9) 
(6.2.10) 
+~mm(H~qHH~l)~mm(a: a q). (62.11) 
~ 1- 2CTmax(H~laq) 
~ 1- 2CTmlD(H~ql)CTmax(aq). 
= 1 _ 2 CTmax(aq) • 
CTmax(Hqq) 
ILet A.B E CNxN be Hernutian For each k = 1.2 •... • N. we have 
(6.212) 
(62.13) 
(62.14) 
2Let A. B E CNxN be Hernutlan and posItive definite. For each k = 1.2 •... • N. 
we have 
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(62.15) 
where (62.9) follows from Weyl's Theorem [107, 4.3.1J; (62.10) follows 
from [109, Fact 5.11.25J; (62.11) follows from [109, Fact 8 1917J; (6.2.13) 
follows from [109, ProposItIon 96.6J and (6.2 15) follows from the definition 
of Frobenius norm. 
Usmg (6215) in (6.2.7), the protection function for user q can be for-
mulated as 
n, 
Rq(Qq,Q_q) 2:: ~)og(1+,/,q.\,(MqQq)), (6216) 
1=1 
= logdet (I + ,/,qH~R:~(Q_q)HqqQq), (62.17) 
where (6 2 17) follows from [107, Theorem 1 2.121 and ,/,q IS defined as 
(6218) 
Note that the lower bound inmcated by ,/,q could be too loose If the 
uncertamty bound €q is too high or if the largest singular value of the direct 
channel, O'max(Hqq) is too small In particular, this could lead to '/'q ::; 0 
However, .\mlD(E~Eq) 2:: O. Hence, the range of ,/,q is i1mlted to 0 < ,/,q::; 1. 
Based on the protection function in (6.2 17), the robust MIMO rate-
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maxinuzation game can be mathematically formulated as 
~a; logdet (I + '}'qH~R:!(Q_q)HqqQq) 
s. t. Qq E .f2q 
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'Vq E n (6 2.19) 
where n £ {I,. ,Q} is the set of the Q players (i e. MIMO lmks), Rq(Qq, Q_q) 
is the payoff function of player q as given in (6.1.4) and the set of admissIble 
strategIes of player q, .f2q , is defined as 
(6.2.20) 
The inequalIty constramt m (6.1 6) is replaced with the equalIty constramt 
in (6.2.20) as, at the optImum of each problem m (6219), the constraint 
must be satISfied wIth eqUalIty [99]. 
Note that the quantity '}'q of user q is dependent only on its own direct-
channel Hqq and ItS uncertamty bound fq, and thus does not need any addi-
tional information (other than the uncertainty bound), such as other users' 
transmit covanances or channel matrices, when computmg the robust so-
lutions Furthermore, the quantIty '}'q is related to the relatIve uncertainty 
in the dIrect channel matnces (determmed by the ratIO fq/O'q(Hqq )). In 
addItion, thIS formulation has the advantage of not needing any addItional 
computational hardware, as the eigendecompositIOn is performed anyway in 
every iteratIOn of the algonthm when computing the waterfilling solutIOns 
Moreover, the additional computational cost is not going to be signllicant, 
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as the quantity Iq needs to be computed only once, at the begmnmg of the 
game 
It can be observed that the robust game f9'~b is eqUivalent to the nominal 
game described in Section 35 (and in [63]), WIth the modified channels 
h~/2Hqq}qEn instead of the original channels {Hqq}qw. 
6.3 Robust-optimization equilibrium 
Recall from Section 3 5 that the solution to the nominal game is the Nash 
eqUlhbrium. In thIS game, given Q_q E !Il_q £ !Ill X ••• X !Ilq_1 X !Ilq+1 X 
.•• .P2Q, the optimum action profile of the players {Q~}qEn at equihbrium 
must satISfy, 'Iq E n, 
(631) 
The robust waterfilling operator RWF~ (-) is defined as 
(6.3.2) 
where JLq IS chosen to satisfy Tr ((JLqI- ~.Dql )+) = Pq The unitary matrix 
of eigenvectors Uq = Uq(Q_q) E IC"T,xnT. and the diagonal matrix Dq = 
Dq(Q_q) E lR:~xnT. are calculated from the eigendecompositlOn 
(63.3) 
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Given the MIMO system m (6.1.1), the non-negative matrix S-y E ~~xQ is 
defined as 
If T # q, 
(6.3.4) 
otherwise 
The sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of 
game f9'r~,t is given by the following theorem. 
THEOREM 6.1. Game f9'rob has at least one equdlbTlum for any feasIble set 
of channel matTlces and transmIt powers of the users. Furthermore, the 
equlllbTlum IS unique If 
(63.5) 
where S-y IS defined In (6.3.4). 
Proof. Refer [63, Theorem 6]. o 
It can be venfied that the above conditIOn reduces to the nommal con-
dition (3 5.18) when there is no uncertamty ('Yq = 1 'Iq EO). An iterative 
algorithm to compute the equihbrium is presented and characterized in the 
following sectIOn. 
6.3.1 Iterative algorithm for robust waterfilling 
Let the discrete set T = /'11+ = 1,2, ... be the set of times at which one or 
more users update their strategies Let Q~n) denote the set of covariance 
matrices of user q at the n-th iteration, and let Tq ~ T denote the set of 
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Algorithm 6.1 - Robust MIMO IteratIve Waterfilling Algorithm 
Input: 
!1: Set of users in the system 
.P1q: Set of admissible strategies of user q 
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Tq: Set of time instants n when the covariance matrIX Q~n) of user q 
IS updated 
T. Number of Iterations for which the algorithm is run 
r;! (n): Time of the most recent covariance matrix of user r aVailable 
to user q at time n 
RWF~ (.): Robust waterfilling operation in (6 3 2) 
Initialization: n = 0 and Q~O) <- any Q E .P1q , 
forn=OtoTdo 
{ 
RWFM (Q(T'(n») 
Q~n+l) = q -q , 
Q(n) q , 
end for 
If nE Tq, 
otherwise 
VqE!1, 
time instants n when the strategy Q~n) of user q is updated. Let r;!(n) 
denote the time when the most recently perceived interference from user r 
was computed by user q at time n (Note that 0 :5 r;!(n) :5 n). Hence, if user 
q updates Its strategy at time n, then 
(6.3.6) 
A fully distributed asynchronous iterative algorithm to compute the eqUi-
librium of game ~r';,1b IS described in Algorithm 6.1. The convergence of 
AlgOrithm 6.1 is guaranteed under the following suffiCiency condition: 
THEOREM 6 2. The robust MIMO ,teratwe waterfilhng algoT'tthm, desCT'Ibed 
m AlgoT'tthm 6 1 converges to the umque equ,ltbT'tum of game ~~b as T -+ 00 
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for any set of feastble tntttal condthons tf (63.5) ts sahsfied. 
Proof. Refer [63, Theorem 7]. o 
When the relative uncertainties, i e, the ratio f q /<1q(Hqq ), of all users IS 
the same, the quantities "Iq of all users is identical In this case, the sufficient 
condition in (635) can be simplified as follows: 
COROLLARY 6.2 1 When the uncertamttes of all the users tS identtcal, t e , 
when "Iq = "I, 'Iq E n, the sujJictent condtfton for the untqueness of the 
equtltbnum and the guamnteed convergence of Algonthm 61, descnbed m 
(6.3 5), reduces to 
p(S) < "I (6.3 7) 
where S ts defined as 
tfr # q, 
(638) 
otherunse 
This result helps analyze the effect of uncertainty on the set of channel 
matrices for which the equihbrium is guaranteed to be unique and Algo-
nthm 6 1 is guaranteed to converge. In the absence of uncertainty, this 
occurs when p(S) < 1, (Corollary 3.7.1). When the uncertainty bound of 
the system increases, the value of "I reduces, and thus, the set of matrices 
that satisfy (63.7) shrmks. Thus, to achieve a robust solutIOn, there is a 
trade-off between allowed uncertamty and guaranteed convergence of the 
algorithm. 
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6.4 Simulation results 
In this section, the average behaviour of the robust MIMO algorithm under 
different scenarios is investigated. The effect of the amount of uncertamty, 
number of users, the number of transmit/receive antennas of each user and 
the level of interference on the average sum-rate of the system are presented 
here. Also, these results are compared with the nommal solution (i e. using 
the MIMO waterfillmg algorithm (Algorithm 32) with erroneous channel 
matrices). 
The Simulation results are provided for a system with Q users averaged 
over 10000 trials with random channel matrices. The cross-channel matnces 
Hrq E CN,xNr are generated with elements drawn from Nc(O, 1) for r f. q 
and the direct-channel matrices Hqq E CN,xNr are generated with elements 
drawn from Nc(0,4). The channel uncertamty model IS Hqq g, Hqq + aq 
where lIaqllF ::; € (from (6 1.2)) The specific parameters are provided with 
each figure. It is to be noted that the quantity dr is the ratio between the 
standard deviation of the elements of the random direct-channel matrices 
and the standard deViation of the elements of the random cross-channel 
matrices. A higher value of dr indicates weaker interference in the system. 
In Figure 6 1, it can be observed that the sum-rate under the robust solu-
tion improves with rise in uncertainty while the sum-rate under the nominal 
solution falls with increase in uncertamty. This gap m performance can be 
observed to be zero under zero uncertainty (since the two solutIOns coincide) 
and rise to about 1.2 nats/transmlsslon when the uncertainty bound is 05 
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The average number of iterations required to converge to the robust solu-
tion against the uncertainty bound of the system is depicted in FIgure 6 2. It 
can be observed that the robust solution takes longer to converge wIth higher 
uncertainty in the system, rising from about 6 iteratIOns at zero uncertamty 
to about 8 Iterations when the uncertainty bound IS 0.5 
In Figure 6 3, the average sum-rate of a system with 2 users is plotted 
against the number of transmIt/receIve antennas of each user. It can be 
observed that the average sum-rate of the robust solution Increases with the 
number of antennas, from about 10 nats/transmisslOn when there are 2 an-
tennas to about 13 nats/transmlsslOn when it is Increased to 6 antennas, 
as expected in MIMO systems. Furthermore, the robust waterfilling solu-
tion consIstently performs better than the nominal solution for the observed 
number of transmit/receive antennas, retaming an improvement of about 1 
nat / transmissIOn. 
FIgure 6.4 demonstrates the effect of number of users on the average 
sum-rate of the system. Increasing the number of users from 2 users to 6 
users results in a lower sum-rate, redUCing from about 8.5 nats/transmission 
to about 6 nats/transmisslOn This is because a higher number of users in 
the system results III more interference for all users, gIven a fixed value of 
d,.. In addition, it can be observed that the robust solution performs better 
than the nominal solutIOn regardless of the number of users in the system 
In Figure 6 5, the effect of the level of interference on the average 
sum-rate of the system IS demonstrated. The average sum-rate at the ro-
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Figure 6.2: Average number of iterations for convergence vs. channel 
uncertainty bound. 
Section 6.4. Simulation results 
Q=2, d,=1 .15, <=0.35 
13.5rr=:'''''''';:='c:=:':;=.c===;----~-----~----, 
.. Robust solution 
13 ·. ·Nominal solution 
12.5 
Q) 12 
n; 
a: 
E 11.5 
" CfJ 11 
Q) 
Cl ['! 10.5 
~ 
...... .' 
.' 
.. " . 
. ' 
.' 
.' 
.' 
.' 
.. ' 
.' 
.' 
.' 
..... 
....... 
.' 
.' 
.' 
.' 
...... 
......... 
• ....... 
8·~L-----~3-----~4-----~5----~6 
Number of txlrx antennas 
147 
Figure 6.3: Sum-rate vs. number of transmit/receive antennas of each 
user. 
8 ·Sr---~---~-----;=",~==:,==;=~ 
"'Robust solution 
~7.5 
a: 
E 
cil 7 
Q) 
Cl ['! 
~ 6.5 
'" 
6 
"1:l • • " . 
.• -Nominal solution 
. ' . 
.. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. . .. .. ....... . ....... .. 
5.5 
2L-----~3----~4-----5L----~6 
Number of users, a 
Figure 6.4: Sum-rate vs. number of users. 
Section 6.4 . Simulation results 
N,=N,=3, Q=2, £ =0.35 
13rr=~~~77.===~--.--------r-------.-------, 
- Robust solution 
12 ~ . ~ Nominal solution 
Q) 11 
... 
a: 
E 10 
=> 
<J) 
Q) 9 
Cl 
!!! 
Q) B "" ." ~ p " 
7 ••••••••.•••••• 
6 
0.75 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 
d , 
148 
Figure 6.5: Sum· rate vs . direct-channel matrix standard deviation , dr . 
bust solution increases with reduction in interference, rising from about 7.5 
nats/transmission when dr is 0.75 to about 12 nats/transmission when dr 
is 2. Note that a higher value of dr indicates weaker interference in the 
system. It can also be observed that the gap in performance between the 
robust solution and the nominal solution is higher when the system has 
higher interference (1 nat/transmission when dr is 0.75) and falls with re-
duction in interference (0.2 nats/transmission when dr is 2). This can be 
explained as follows: the robust solution encourages each user to be less 
greedy, which results in lower interference for all users. In systems with 
stronger cross-channel matrices, this plays a greater role in determining the 
observed information rates of the users, when compared to systems with 
weak cross-channel matrices. Thus, when dr increases, the robust solution 
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moves closer to the nominal solutIOn. 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a robust formulation for the rate-maximizatlOn game in 
MIMO Gaussian interference channels in the presence of bounded channel 
uncertamty was developed Insprred from the robust game model, best re-
sponse of each user was based on a lower bound of the payoff function (pro-
tectIOn functIOn) and resulted in a distributIOn-free equilibrium solution 
Furthermore, the robust MIMO rate-maxunization game was observed to 
be equivalent to the nominal MIMO rate-maximization game with modified 
direct-channel matrices. ThIS enabled the characterizatIOn and computation 
of the equilibrium utilizing an Iterative waterfilhng algorithm. Finally, sim-
ulation results demonstrated that the robust solutIOn leads to better global 
performance, with higher achieved sum-rates 
Chapter 7 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS 
AND FUTURE WORK 
In this chapter, the novel results of thIS thesis and the conclusions that can 
be drawn from them are summarized, followed by a discussion on future 
work that this work could lead to. 
7.1 Summary and conclusions 
The focus of this thesIs has been the deSign of distributed algorithms to 
maximize the information rates of users in single-antenna and multi-antenna 
Gaussian interference channels in the presence of uncertamty in channel state 
information based on game theory. 
In Chapter 1, the challenge of multmser interference m next-generation 
wireless technologies was given as the motivation for the work contained 
in this theSIS. Game theory has evolved as a suitable framework to deSign 
resource allocation schemes for such users The majority of the current liter-
150 
Section 7 1 Summary and conclusions 151 
ature on game-theoretic solutions for resource allocation in wireless commu-
mcations has assumed the availablhty of perfect channel knowledge, which 
IS not possible m a practical situation. Hence, this thesIs addressed the 
need for the analysis of the effect of lllperfect channel knowledge on the 
performance of such game-theoretic methods and for the design of robust 
game-theoretic solutions which perform satisfactorily despite having imper-
fect channel knowledge 
In Chapter 2, relevant concepts from game theory have been bnefly de-
SCribed ThiS included an overview of game theory and ItS underlying as-
sumptions, followed by an introductIOn to the strategic noncooperative game 
and the concept of the Nash eqmhbrium. This was followed by a dISCUSSIOn 
on the idea of eqmlibrium efficiency and a few popular measures to quantify 
it. Fmally, the llllltations of the concept of the N ash eqUlhbrmm have been 
considered, and a robust optimization based approach to mitigatmg uncer-
tamty in game theory called the robust game model has been introduced as 
the basis for the solutions presented in tlus thesis. 
In Chapter 3, the conceptual foundations from fixed point theory, con-
traction mapping and mformation theory underpinning the work presented 
in this theSIS have been summarized In addition, thiS chapter introduced 
the specific game-theoretic problem formulations under which the Issue of 
channel uncertainty is considered in this thesiS. Finally, the effect of channel 
uncertamtyon the performance ofthe MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm, 
which demonstrates the need for robust solutions, has been investigated in 
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thIs chapter. 
In Chapter 4, a review of the current lIterature addressmg the issue of un-
certamty in rate-maximization games for mterference channels has been pre-
sented. Following tills, a robust formulation for the rate-maximIZation game 
In SISO frequency-selectIve Gaussian mterference channels under bounded 
channel uncertaInty has been developed A dIStribution-free robust opt,m,za-
tzon equ,lzbrzum for thiS problem has been derived and proved to eXIst for all 
feasIble channel realizations and to be umque under certain suffiCIent con-
ditIOns. An iteratIve algorithm to compute the equilibrium in a distrIbuted 
fashion has also been developed and shown to asymptotically converge when 
the equilIbrIUm is unique. Simulation results have confirmed the behaviour 
of the algorIthm and also have revealed an Interesting effect of improvement 
in sum-rate of the system when channel uncertaInty increases 
In Chapter 5, the improvement In sum-rate WIth Increase in uncertaInty 
that was observed in the prevIous chapter has been analytIcally investIgated 
in a two-user setting Based on the analysis of a sImple two-frequency system, 
sufficient conditions for the improvement of sum-rate and price of anarchy 
In a system With asymptotIcally large number of frequencIes WIth increase in 
uncertainty have been derIved. In a nutshell, these results indicate that the 
robust-optImIzation eqUlhbrium moves towards a frequency division multiple 
access (FDMA) solution as the uncertamty increases, thereby resultmg in 
the Improvement of sum-rate and prIce of anarchy when FDMA solutions 
are known to be globally optimal. 
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In Chapter 6, a robust formulation for the rate-maximization game in 
M1MO GaussIan mterference channels in the presence of bounded channel 
uncertainty has been developed The robust game thus developed has been 
shown to be eqUivalent to the nominal M1MO rate-maximizatIOn game wIth 
modIfied channel matrices. The robust-optimizatton eqUlhbrium for thIS 
game and an iterative algorithm to compute It distributtvely have been pre-
sented and characterIzed. N umericaI sImulatIOns on the behavIOur of thIS 
solutIOn have indIcated that the robust solution (m the presence of channel 
uncertainty) performs better than the nommal solution (wIth perfect channel 
knowledge), SImIlar to the robust 8180 Iterattve waterfilling algOrIthm 
Based on the results presented in thIS thesIS, it can be concluded that 
a robust game theoretic approach whIch unifies robust opttmIzation tech-
niques and tradItIOnal noncooperatlve game theory is a suitable approach 
to addressmg channel uncertamty In rate-maxtmIzatIOn games Worst-case 
robust optimization is often too conservattve in tradIttonal smgle-objecttve 
optimIzatIOn problems (such as beamformer desIgn [110]) m order to en-
sure zero outage which results in a loss in performance However, such a 
worst-case approach results in having the opposite effect m the multt-user 
game-theorettc setting where there are multiple coupled optimization prob-
lelllS. 
The conservattve solutions forced upon each user by worst-case optimiza-
tion reduces their greedmess which causes lesser mterference to the other 
users in the system When the system has sIgnificant mterference (Le. the 
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cross-channels are comparable to the dIrect-channels}, such a conservative 
approach by all users results in reduced interference for all users, which 
in turn leads to Improved information rates for the users ThiS provides 
valuable msight mto the design of better utility functions and mechanisms 
which, m some fashion, encourages reduced competition among selfish users 
(m the form of mterference) and yields solutions which are closer to Pareto 
optimallty, and yet enable distributed computation. 
7.2 Future work 
There are several directions in which the research presented in this thesiS 
can be extended. The solutIOns presented here are for systems with open 
spectrum access, but they could be extended to the cognitive radio sce-
nario, where there is an interference constramt which limits the mterference 
observed at a licensed user. In addition, the robust MIMO Iterative wa-
terfilling algorithm presented in Chapter 6 IS hmited to square nonsingnlar 
channels, and can be extended to apply to systems with arbitrary charmels. 
Another problem that could be considered is the robust rate-maximization 
game for MIMO systems with not Just a total power constraint, but also a 
per-antenna power constraint. Also, the robust MIMO Iterative waterfill-
mg algOrithm conSiders only uncertamty m the channel matrices, but not in 
the estimatIOn of the covariance matrix of noise-plus-multiuser interference. 
Accounting for uncertainty in the estimation of the covarlance matrIX is par-
tICularly chalIengmg, as such an estimatIOn occurs in every Iteration of the 
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algorithm, and will lead to the breakdown of the defimtiOn of fixed pomts in 
such cases. 
The robust solutions and techniques proposed in this theSIS could also be 
extended to other power-control problems such as utlhzed power mmnniza-
tion subject to quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. This leads to problem 
formulatiOns beyond the Nash equihbrlUm, m the area of nonhnear comple-
mentary problems and variatiOnal inequalities. 
Another issue of mterest is the behaviOur of robust waterfilling algorithms 
in the multiple equilibna regime (when the cross-channels are very strong), 
which has received attention orily recently for the Situation when there is 
perfect channel knowledge [96]. Some of the questiOns that are of mterest 
are: Is the multipliCity of eqUlhbria affected by channel uncertainty? Are 
certain eqUlhbna favoured at certain levels of uncertamty? Does the update 
order of the algonthm affect convergence and/or the eqUlhbrlUm achieved? 
Does the initialization affect the convergence and/or eqUilibrium achieved? 
Security considerations m the robust SISO Iterative waterfillmg algo-
rithm presented in Chapter 4 are also of interest. This algonthm assumes 
public knowledge of the power allocation vectors, and has no safeguards 
agamst maliCiOUS users reporting false values. Designing mechanisms which 
discourage collUSiOn and jammmg though such means are necessary. 
The methods proposed in this thesIS also assume quasl-statiOnarity of 
the environment for the duratiOn of the game. Extending these solutions 
to the dynamic case where channels could be changmg states IS of interest. 
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Another open problem of this general area is the scalabllity issue, as the 
Nash equilIbrium has sigmficant limitations when there are large number of 
users in the systems, each having large action-spaces. 
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